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ABSTRACT
Over the past decade the cost and frequency of cybercrime has skyrocketed and is still increasing
year over year. Major targets of cyber attacks are financial organizations, energy and utility
companies, governmental agencies, and technology companies. However, almost all businesses
are at risk. The increasing threat and cost of cyber crime is caused by many factors, including:
the increasing reliance on cyber networks, constantly evolving exploitation and cyber attack
methods, and insufficient development of defensive mechanisms to predict and prevent cyber
attackers. Promising research in the proactive defense against cyber attacks exists in the field of
cyber situational awareness (Cyber SA), but is limited partially due to the limited availability of
cyber attack data from desirable attack scenarios. This work improves upon previous
development of a cyber attack simulator capable of modeling complex cyber attacks consisting
of computer networks, their defenses, and cyber attacker behavior. The main contribution of this
work is the introduction of a new model called the Attack Guidance Template (AGT),
responsible for the definition of simulated cyber attack sequences and for guiding the attacker to
the goal of the attack sequence. The AGT allows the user to define desired cyber attack
sequences with flexibility and ranging levels of specificity. This work also introduces an attack
sequence analyzer to aid the user in understanding the likelihood of the model attack sequences
being accomplished successfully with different attackers across various networks. To ensure the
validity of these developments, both the analyzer and the AGT are verified and compared to the
previous cyber attack guidance template.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Cyber attacks on computer networks are a large concern due to a heavy reliance of businesses
and government agencies on their cyber infrastructure. The cyber networks used by these
organizations are critical to their everyday business and often store sensitive information. A
cyber attack performed on such a network could allow an outsider the ability to gain access to
sensitive information, or even damage portions of the network, disrupting the organization’s
daily function.
Cyber attacks on such organizations are becoming a more frequent and more costly
problem year by year. Ponemon Institute conducts a yearly study to determine the cost of cyber
crime throughout the world. In 2013, Ponemon Institute collected a sample of 234 organizations
from various industries and reported that each organization incurred an average annual cost of
7.2 million dollars due to cyber attacks. This cost was a 30 percent increase from the 2012
average. (Ponemon Institute, 2013). During the 2014 study the average cost raised another 10.4
percent. Along with this yearly cost, it was reported that a single cyber attack took on average 31
days for an organization to resolve. Resulting in an average cost around 600 thousand dollars per
single cyber attack occurrence. (Ponemon Institute, 2014).
A major reason for the large growth is due to the inability of cyber defense measures to
keep pace with the constantly evolving methods of cyber attackers. The current methods of cyber
defense take a reactive approach where most networks that fall victim to a cyber attack are not
aware until a cyber attacker makes their presence known and have already retrieved the
information or performed the task they set out to do. A current common method of cyber defense
includes the adoption of an intrusion detection system (IDS). An IDS consists of a set of sensors
placed throughout the network in order to monitor the network activity. These IDS sensors
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monitor both day to day activity, and detect unusual or suspicious activity by using techniques
such as anomaly detection, deep packet inspection, and/or signature matching. The outputs of
these sensors are alerts. These alerts are viewed by someone such as a system administrator or
network security officer who can try to identify any potential threats. Identifying these threats
and separating them from the day to day activity is however, not a simple task, everyday noise of
the network often muddles the true, ground truth alerts generated from a cyber attack. Along
with the everyday noise, cyber attackers are getting better at disguising themselves amongst the
noise. (Pathan, 2014).
For example, on larger networks, an IDS can produce tens of thousands of alerts daily,
the majority of which are associated with the noise of the network. The noise within a network is
defined as the everyday actions which can be considered nonthreatening. This noise can consist
of anything from bad password attempts generated by employees to software bugs causing the
generation of bad packets. Other alerts produced by these sensors are those produced by either
attacks or unwanted sources. These alerts can be indicative of malicious activity occurring within
the network due to a single or multiple attackers. The malicious alerts mixed in with the other
alerts generated from the noise, can become almost impossible to detect, and can occur either
very quickly or over a large period of time. System administrators or network security officers
are then tasked with attempting to identify these malicious attack-related alerts from the large set
and determining what course of action, if any, they should take.
Promising research in combatting cyber attacks and cyber threats exists in the field of
cyber situational awareness (Cyber SA). Cyber SA is centered on identifying and analyzing
cyber attacks as they take place within a network and then providing the relevant information to
a system administrator so they can mitigate the threat as soon as possible. Cyber SA is a complex
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problem and a broad field encompassing many areas of research. Cyber SA can be broken into
the following main steps: the recognition of an attack, the correlation and fusion of related
information, assessment of the current state and the impact on the network, and providing
potential future state scenarios, all of which must be communicated to the user effectively
(Tadda & Salerno, 2010). Being able to accomplish a useable Cyber SA system requires the
collaboration of several different fields of research. Many issues currently exist with the
development of Cyber SA algorithms, a main one being the limited amount of cyber attack
datasets available. These datasets are needed in order to develop, analyze, and improve upon
Cyber SA algorithms (Barford, et al., 2010).
Ideal datasets for Cyber SA research may include the reported IDS outputs during the
time of the attack, along with the ground truth, the actual alerts that were triggered by the
attacker during the time of the attack, and the corresponding actions which triggered the alerts.
Datasets of this caliber are very limited in number, most organizations that were exposed to a
cyber attack threat are not willing to release this information and data. Other techniques in
generating this data are very difficult and resource intensive. Furthermore, a researcher looking
to obtain these sorts of datasets will also want to analyze attacks of very specific setups. These
setups can consist of different networks, different attacker behaviors, and different attack
sequence goals. The lack of availability of datasets truly limits the development of Cyber SA
algorithms and tools, hindering our progress in the active defense against cyber attacks.
Due to the potential of Cyber SA and the problems currently faced, this research has been
conducted to use simulation as a tool to allow a user to simulate their desired cyber attack
scenarios. This will allow a researcher to produce the desired datasets, containing the IDS output
of the modeled network as well as the ground truth of the attacks. New features and flexibility

3

have been added with the development of a new state of the art cyber attack simulation software,
CASCADES: Cyber Attack SCenario And network DEfense Simulator, based off a current
simulator, Multistage Attack Scenario Simulator (MASS) developed by Moskal et al. (2014).
MASS is described in detail in the Chapter 2. The additional features will expand upon its
current capabilities and flexibility and develop a user interface to specify attack sequences.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND – Multistage Attack Scenario Simulator
This thesis work builds on current work by Moskal et al. (2014) and their development of a cyber
attack simulator. This background chapter is intended to review the overall structure and function
of Multistage Attack Scenario Simulator (MASS). (Moskal et al., 2014)
MASS is a simulation tool designed to produce IDS output created from a highly flexible
set of inputs. These inputs also known as the context models define the network to be attacked,
the behavior of the attacker(s), and goal(s) of the attack(s). To control the simulation of cyber
attacks MASS is composed of a simulation core. The simulation core drives the simulation by
referencing the four context models: Vulnerability Hierarchy (VH), Virtual Terrain v2 (VT.2),
Attack Behavior Model (ABM), and Scenario Guidance Template (SGT). These context models
provide the necessary input for the simulator to function. The VT.2 and SGT expand upon the
context models from previous works, the Virtual Terrain (Holsopple, Yang, & Argauer, 2008)
and the Guidance Template (Stotz & Sudit, 2007). Both models were previously implemented in
a cyber attack simulator developed by Kuhl et al. (2007), the initial inspiration for MASS. Each
of the context models used in the simulator are treated independently of one another and together
define the attack scenario to be simulated. An attack scenario consists of the simulation of a
single or multiple hackers (ABMs) with various attack goals (AGTs) within a network (VT.2).
Figure 1 shows an overview of the simulator and its components.
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Figure 1: Overview of MASS

Overall, each context model plays a key part in the definition of an attack scenario and
each attack sequence. The VH defines and relates all of the information regarding the
vulnerabilities, the types of attack, the weaknesses exploited, the affected services, and the
exploit performed. The VT.2 defines the computer network, its machines, their services, and the
network’s connectivity. The ABM defines an individual hacker’s behavior including their
capabilities, preferences, skill, etc. The SGT intends to define the goal of the attack sequence and
guide the attacker to the defined goal. These context models are used by the simulator core to
control the simulation and produce the resulting IDS output and ground truth files (Moskal et al.,
2014).
2.1 The Vulnerability Hierarchy
The VH contains a hierarchical mapping of all of the potential vulnerabilities that the simulator
can use. The simulator employs the use of the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) developed
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and managed by the MITRE
Corporation to specify a default VH for the cyber domain. This VH is comprised of four-level
hierarchical structure, the lowest level being the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
6

(CVEs). The CVEs are the exploits that can be performed to compromise a machine through the
unique vulnerabilities of the services or software. Each of these CVEs contain an associated
parameter to represent the difficulty of the exploit. The Common Platform Enumerations (CPEs)
represent the services that can be represented on the machine. The level above the CPEs contain
the Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs), a set of categories that define the typical
software weaknesses. The final and highest level of the VH consists of CWE categories or types.
The types allow a user of the simulator to more easily select and define a cyber attack. Examples
of types include: “Denial of Service: resource consumption (CPU)”, “Modify Application Data”,
and “Gain privileges / assume identity.” A small section of the VH is shown in Figure 2. Level
one represents the CWE categories, moving to the CWE’s, CPE’s, and finally the CVE’s at level
four. (Moskal et al., 2014).

Figure 2: Subset of the VH (Moskal et. al, 2014)

To maintain up to date vulnerability exploit information MASS employs an automatic
update function that utilizes the NVD and allows the simulator’s VH to stay up to date as new
vulnerabilities and exploits are discovered and added to the databases. The CVEs are also
mapped to the alerts produced by the IDS sensors. The current setup for MASS employs the use
of Snort, a common open source network-based intrusion detection system. In addition to the
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NVD, the VH also includes a reconnaissance category to allow a more realistic simulation. The
reconnaissance category enables the simulator to model network and machine discovery attempts
of the attacker such as ping sweeps, and port scans which are not considered within the NVD.
2.2 The Virtual Terrain v2
The VT.2 is a data structure which contains the information defining the computer network that
the attacks are going to be simulated on. The VT.2 is a graph like structure where the machines
are represented as nodes. These nodes can represent the servers, workstations, and routing
devices. Each machine of the VT.2 contains a set of parameters which define it including the IP
address, type of machine, monitoring IDS sensors, and internet visibility. A node that is not
considered a connector (e.g. routers, switches, hubs, etc.) can contain a list of services referenced
from the VH. Through reference of the VH, these services become the vulnerabilities of the
machines that the simulated attacker is able to exploit to compromise the machine. If an attacker
was to attempt an exploit and the machine had a sensor monitoring it, the attack would be
detected. Sensors contained on a machine can be setup to monitor certain areas of the network
and report the alert mapped to that exploit in the simulator sensor output (Moskal et al., 2014).
2.3 The Attacker Behavior Model
The third context model, the ABM allows the simulation of specific attacker behaviors. The
ABM contains parameters to describe their stealth, persistence, skill, attack preferences, and
node preferences of the hacker. Attack preferences can be made based off of any level of the VH,
and node preferences are based on the IP address of the machines within the network. This
allows the modeling of attackers that more commonly perform specific types of exploits as well
as model attackers that have preexisting knowledge of the network, developed through some
passive reconnaissance or social engineering techniques. The stealth parameter of the attacker
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determines how often the attacker is capable of avoiding sensors and sensor detection. This
parameter can decrease the amount of alerts that are produced by the attacker throughout the
attack. The persistence of the attacker is represented in the average number of attempts an
attacker will perform of an exploit and for how many different exploits the attacker will attempt
on their target. The attacker’s skills and capabilities are represented by a skill level parameter.
This skill level is compared to the difficulty parameter that is defined on each CVE (Moskal et
al., 2014).
2.4 The Scenario Guidance Template
The final context model is the SGT, which represents a series of steps required to accomplish the
goal of the attack sequence and guides the attacker to this goal. The SGT can be thought of as a
graph like structure composed of nodes and arcs where each node represents a stage of the attack
while the arcs contain the required actions the attacker must perform in order to transition
between stages. After the result of each attack step, a single exploit attempt conducted by the
attacker, is determined the SGT is referenced to determine which arc will be followed. The
actions that are defined on each arc can reference any level within the VH and also if the
performed exploit was successful or not. A default arc is also implemented on each stage to catch
any unspecified conditions. Each stage of the SGT contains parameters allowing the user to
specify if the stage can be used as the starting stage for the simulation, if the stage is the goal of
the sequence, and if the target machine will be changed during that stage. Stages can also be
specified as restricted allowing the simulator to only attempt exploits that satisfy the conditions
on the arcs. This restriction setting is intended to guide the attacker along the defined goal
(Moskal et al., 2014).
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Figure 3: SQL Attack SGT (A: Recon, B: Network Scan, C: DoS Attack, D: MySQL Services)
(Moskal et al., 2014)
Figure 3 created by Moskal et al. (2014) depicts a three stage SGT for an SQL attack. An attack

sequence using this SGT will begin on the first stage, “Information Gathering.” Since this stage
is restricted, the simulator will restrict the potential exploit choices to those that satisfy any of the
three arcs: level 1 reconnaissance, level 2 network scans, or level 1 DoS Attacks. An attack is
then selected and performed. If one of these conditions is satisfied a transition in the current
stage will occur. If none of the conditions are satisfied, the default arc will be used. As the
simulation progresses, the goal stage, “SQL Attack” may become the current stage and if arc (3,
D) is satisfied, meaning a machine was compromised through an exploit within a MySQL
service the simulation will end in success.
The four context models described previously are all controlled by the simulator core
logic. The core simulation logic is responsible in referencing each of the context models to select
the actions that will take place, and keep track of the status of the simulation.
The core logic begins with the attack controller whose purpose is to initialize and run
each individual attack sequence which consists of its own an ABM and SGT (attacker with a
goal). Once the attack controller creates the attack sequences, they are responsible for simulating
each of their attacks and tracking the attack’s status until the attacker has reached their goal or
has given up on the attempt.
10

During the attack sequences, attack steps are generated which represent an exploit
attempt performed by the attacker. A single attack step is performed by selecting an element
from each of the level of the VH, beginning at the highest level, type and then proceeding
through the lower levels. These selections at each level of the VH can be influenced by
restrictions on the SGT to guide, and by the preferences specified in the ABM to mimic an
attacker. If the current stage of the SGT is restricted, this forces the potential selections to those
that will satisfy one of the arc conditions in the current stage. The attacker’s preferences are then
referenced through the ABM to decide the exploit. Once an exploit has been chosen the
simulator checks to ensure the target machine is vulnerable to the attack and attempts the exploit
until the attack is successful or the attacker gives up. The attack step then returns its result to the
attack sequence to determine the effects of the action.
During the attack sequences, the attack steps and network noise are logged within the two
output files, the ground truth and the sensor output. The attack sequences reference the various
context models and the results of the attack steps they spawn to decide if the current target or
source need to be switched, the stage of the SGT should be changed, and if the goal specified in
the SGT for the attack sequence has been met. Once all attack sequences are completed, the
attack controller will end the simulation and make the output files available to the user. To
complete an attack sequence the goal can be met or the attacker can run out of actions to
perform.
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CHAPTER 3: PROBLEM AND SCOPE
As stated previously, cyber attacks are becoming an increasing threat to the cyber infrastructure
that is used by society. Organizations face this threat, as they often heavily rely on a cyber
infrastructure for day-to-day business. These organizations often store sensitive and proprietary
data such as, intellectual property and customer/employee information. Hackers will often
attempt to target such a network to gain this information. Under the effect of a cyber attack an
attacker can also disrupt the organizations cyber infrastructure taking down valuable resources
such as a web server. Organizations do their best to defend against such attacks however
attackers are evolving at a faster rate than the defenses protecting the network. This increasing
threat of hackers and cyber attacks is also partnered with an increasing annual cost faced due to
cyber attacks.
Current methods in the defense against cyber attacks involve the implementation of
reactive defense mechanisms that are put in place to identify suspicious activity within a network
which may indicate the existence of a hacker. An example of such a mechanism is an IDS system
which monitors network traffic to produce alerts when suspicious activity is detected. Advanced
proactive defense mechanisms are being researched, however, the research is limited by the
availability of cyber attack datasets, which are limited in availability and very costly to generate
with current means. A preexisting cyber attack simulator, MASS has been developed to attempt
to produce these datasets. This thesis will expand upon the work conducted with MASS and
focus on the development of a new cyber attack simulator, Cyber Attack SCenario and network
DEfense Simulator (CASCADES). CASCADES aims to have additional functionality and
greater usability in the field of cyber simulation. The focus of this thesis will be on providing the
user with more ease, capabilities, and flexibility in the definition of the goal of the attack
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sequence and guiding the attacker along this goal. MASS’s current context model, the SGT is
responsible for this function, however, can be improved upon.
The current SGT poses limitations on the types of attack sequences a user can model and
simulate. The SGT is graph like structure which defines the goal of the attack sequence and
tracks the progression of the attacker along this goal. The SGT is also capable of providing
guidance to the attacker aiding them in the progression of the goal. A single stage of the SGT is
tracked throughout the simulation and the arcs from that stage represent the attacks that need to
occur to make a transition. This single stage tracking across the course of the simulation causes
complications when designing an SGT. An in-depth knowledge of the simulator core and the
other context models is required in order to setup an attack sequence that will be successful. A
user must consider how the simulator decides to switch machines and perform attacks. Along
with this the layout of the network, and the attacker’s capabilities must be considered. These
requirements limit the ability for these context models to be switched out for one another since
an SGT needs to often be tailored to a specific VT or ABM. Within the SGT, progression and
guidance is only based on the exploits that are performed through the definition of arcs. A user
may also want to guide the attacker based on the machines that have been uncovered throughout
the sequences of the attack. The definition of an arc allows a single vulnerability hierarchy level
to be referenced and only a single item within that level to be selected. Not being able to define
across multiple levels and group items together can cause the user to need to define additional
arcs to create their desired sequence. If these issues are addressed within a new guidance
template, a user will be able to more easily setup and design their desired attack sequences.
Along with these limitations many criteria are important to the overall design of a new
guidance template. When defining the goal of an attack sequence considerations need to be made
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to ensure specificity, flexibility and ease of use. Users with different backgrounds may want to
define attack sequence goals with various levels of specificity. For example, a user of the
simulator may want to see an attack sequence where the attacker first penetrates deep into the
network creating various stepping stones, using specific privilege escalation exploits. After this
penetration the attacker is then to accomplish three DoS attacks throughout the network before
finally performing a SQL injection to obtain data from a SQL server. This example covers a
moderately detailed goal, and would be typical of a more advanced user. However, a user with a
deep knowledge of cyber attacks may want to go deeper and simulate a very particular sequence
of exploits, perhaps modeling an attack that has previously occurred on a real network. A goal
should however not be limited to this fine detail and a user may also want to just see a SQL
injection performed anywhere on the network. There are an infinite number of possibilities that a
user may want to simulate and the goal of the new guidance template is to be capable of defining
as many as possible.
To ensure flexibility, a user must be able to guide based on more than just the attack to be
performed and must be able to guide based on where the attack is performed as well. To provide
this, two segmentation levels of an attack sequence can be provided. The first level defines the
overall goal structure which can consist of sequence of attacks. The second level provides a per
machine look at the sequence, and the user can define categories of machines in which the
attacker will perform specific exploits depending upon that machine’s state. These two levels of
detail allow the definition of the goal to be highly flexible.
With the current simulator MASS, the context models are created and stored in XML files.
Storing and defining these context models in XML makes it cumbersome for a user to interpret,
design, and setup complex guidance templates. Within CASCADES, a user should be able to create
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and edit guidance templates graphically. A graphical user interface (GUI) will need to be provided to
define the details of the guidance template.

Along with the issues faced in the definition of a new guidance template and the
considerations to be taken, once the attack sequence is created, the user will also want to know if
it is likely to be successful. MASS currently has no visibility on this aspect. The complex
interactions between the network, attacker behavior, and goal of the attack sequence make this
determination difficult for the user. If an attack sequence is impossible or very unlikely the user
will have to perform countless simulations before achieving a successful result or giving up on
the attack sequence.
Overall, the focus of this thesis work will be in the development and definition of a new
guidance template improving upon the limitations of the SGT and taking into account the
considerations discussed. Along with the new guidance template, a GUI will be created to allow
the editing and saving of the raw XML data files the guidance template is stored in. The final
contribution of this work will be the development of a sequence analysis tool to aid the user in
determining if the designed attack sequence is likely to be successful.
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CHAPTER 4: LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter is intended to cover five topics related to this research problem including: computer
networks, stages of cyber attacks, previous cyber attack simulators, cyber situational awareness,
and cyber attack models. The first section, provides information regarding the basics of computer
networks. In this section basic networking principles are covered including network topology,
ports, services, and intrusion detection systems (IDSs). The second section covers the common
stages of a cyber attack. This chapter is intended to provide a reader with little to no knowledge
in this field a basic understanding of a computer networking and the progression of an attacker
within a network during a multistage cyber attack. Research into cyber situational awareness and
cyber attack modeling are relatively new fields, while the first cyber attack simulator was
developed in 1999. Although the early development of cyber attack simulators, not much has
been done recently to further this research. This literature review will serve as a discussion of
these topics, providing an overview to the relatively new field of cyber situational awareness,
and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of both cyber attack simulators and cyber attack
models.
4.1 Computer Networks
A computer network can be defined as a set of two or more computers, and other computing
hardware (e.g., printers, routers, modems, etc.) that are interconnected with the purpose of
communication and sharing of their resources. Computer networks are commonly classified
depending on the geographical spread of the network. This research will focus on local area
networks (LANs), networks in which the interconnected devices are located close together. LAN
can vary greatly in number of devices, from home networks consisting of two devices to a large
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business with hundreds or even thousands of interconnected computing devices, also known as
enterprise networks (Tanenbaum & Wetherall, 2011).
The physical setup of a network is called the topology, several types of topologies exist
each with their own set of advantages and disadvantages. Figure 4 shows a few example
topologies.

Ring

Star

Tree

Figure 4: Example Network Topologies

Within a ring topology, equal access is given to all computers and signals sent to any computer
on the ring will be received by all intermediate computers. The computers must rely on each
other to send and receive packets of information and if one computer fails it will bring down the
rest of the ring. The star topology, a single central device controls the interactions between the
computers. Unlike the ring network, if one of the links or computers is to fail with exception to
the central networking device, the rest of the network will remain functional. The star topology is
also more desirable for a network administrator, allowing easy analysis of traffic and control
over the network through one central hub. The tree topology allows large scalability, and easy
expansion which is desirable in larger networks with multiple departments. Maintenance and
configuration of a tree network can be complex and have high costs. Enterprise networks are
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often to combine multiple topologies to form a hybrid topology or operate multiple LANs, in
order to better suit each department’s needs (Bonaventure, 2011).
Enterprise networks often employ a client-server model where two main types of
computers are used, clients and servers. While using this network model, servers are capable of
sharing their services with its connected clients. Services are software that provides a specific
functionality to that machine. In a client-server model, the clients send queries to the servers
requesting the use of their resource and the server will grant access to the client. Different types
of servers exist and are often categorized by the services they provide to its clients; examples of
servers include application servers, web servers, print servers, e-mail servers, etc. Clients are also
capable of possessing their own personal services as well. The services contained on the network
machines sometimes contain software bugs, or security issues. These issues contained within the
services are more commonly known as vulnerabilities, and if they remain unpatched can be
exploited by a hacker who can attack and gain access to the machine that is running the service
through the performance of an exploit. Once this is done, an attacker may be capable of
retrieving or deleting information, harming the machine, or using the machine as a stepping stone
to machines further within the network (Tanenbaum & Wetherall, 2011).
Machines contained on a computer network are interconnected and communicate through
the use of ports. Machines are capable of having multiple ports, each of which can communicate
with a single machine. Machines communicate through a network by sending packets of
information which contains data for how the packet should be routed, and what information to
send.
In order to monitor a network of suspicious and malicious activity, an intrusion detection
system (IDS) is employed. An IDS main purpose is to monitor network traffic and identify
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potential intrusions which are reported to a system administrator so they can decide how to
respond. There are three common detection methodologies that are used by an IDS: Signature
Based Detection, Anomaly Based Detection, and Stateful Protocol Analysis. Each of these
techniques use different methodologies to determine if the information it is analyzing has the
potential of being malicious by comparing the current information to commonly observed events
or predefined profiles and activities. IDSs are not perfect, and not all malicious activity will be
detected and reported to the systems administrator. The predefined profiles and activities do not
contain all attacks and malicious activity, hackers are also rapidly finding newer vulnerabilities
and exploits (Scarfone & Mell, 2007).
4.2 Stages of a Cyber Attack
A cyber attack can commonly be broken into five main stages: Passive Reconnaissance, Active
Reconnaissance or Scanning, Gaining Access, Maintaining Access, and Covering Tracks. This
section will go into detail surrounding these five stages (Skoudis & Liston, 2006).
Stages of an Attack

Passive
Reconnaissance

Active
Reconnaissance

Gaining Access

Maintaining
Access

Covering Tracks

Common Techniques
Low-technology
Techniques

Network Scanning

Application Based
Attacks

Port Scanning
Web Searches

Network Based
Attacks

Whois Lookups

Trojans

Altering Event Logs

Backdoors

Hiding Files/
Directories

Rootkits
Covert Channels

Denial of Service
Attacks

Figure 5: The common stages of a cyber attack, and examples of common techniques used

During the passive reconnaissance stage of an attack, the attacker aims to gather as much
information as possible about the network including, IP addresses, the network layout and size,
19

and even passwords. There are a variety of passive reconnaissance techniques an attacker can
employ to gather this data and include, low-technology techniques, web searches, and whois
database lookups. When used together these techniques enable an attacker to gain a great
understanding of the network before actively attacking the network. Low-technology techniques
involve gathering information without the aid of computer technology. Social engineering is a
common technique used, where an attacker will trick a member of the target organization into
revealing sensitive information. Another low-technology technique is dumpster diving for old
hard drives, thrown out documents containing system information, user lists, or passwords. Web
searches and whois database lookups are other types of passive reconnaissance that allow an
attacker to gain knowledge of the network. Through Google searches, an attacker can obtain
information regarding employee information, phone numbers, technology being used, and
business partners. Whois databases can be searched to determine an organizations IP addresses,
server names, email addresses, etc. (Skoudis & Liston, 2006).
The next stage of a cyber attack is active reconnaissance, also known as scanning and
begins the actual attacking of the network. The first step of active reconnaissance is to gain
information on the mapping of the network, and the available IPs for attack, this is known as
network scanning. A technique of network scanning is sweeping where the attacker pings, sends
a message to an IP address in the target network to determine if that IP is an active host. If a
message is returned, the IP address has an active machine. Once a machine if found port
scanning is performed. Ports act as the communication end points on the network and often are
linked to specific services. Multiple ports exist on a computer, and allow a computer to have
multiple connections with many machines. Port scanning is very similar to network scanning
where a ping is sent to the port and if a response is received the port is active. Software tools are
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often employed to scan a range of common ports, and determine if any of them are active.
Obtaining an active port gives the attacker a way to fully communicate with a machine and an
idea on which services are being run (Skoudis & Liston, 2006).
The third stage of a cyber attack is gaining access and is where the actual exploits are
performed on the network. This stage is performed using the information gathered in the first two
stages of the attack. There are various types of exploits which include application attacks,
network attacks, and denial of service (DoS) attacks. Application attacks are those performed by
exploiting vulnerabilities contained within the services of a machine. One of the most common
application attacks is a buffer overflow and allows an attacker to exploit poorly written code to
execute their own malicious code. Network attacks allow an attacker to manipulate the network’s
setup, and how services interact with other areas of the network. This can allow the attacker to
gain access to machines within the network. A common network attack is sniffing which could
provide a user with user IDs and passwords. Many other types of attacks exist, this research
focuses on application or service based attacks (Skoudis & Liston, 2006).
The fourth stage of a cyber attack is maintaining access, and implements a variety of
software to allow the attacker to access the machine in the future. Common techniques an
attacker uses to maintain access to a machine are trojans, backdoors, and root kits. The final
stage of a cyber attack is covering tracks and attackers employ techniques to alter logs, and hide
malicious files. Descriptions of these two stages are outside the scope of this research and are
covered in more detail in the work of Skoudis & Liston (2006).
4.3 Previous Cyber Attack Simulators
The initial cyber attack simulator was developed in 1999 by Fred Cohen and used his previously
developed cause-and-effect model for cyber attacks which was capable of modeling various
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threat profiles (attackers), attack mechanisms (attacks), and protective mechanisms (defenses).
Cohen’s cause and effect model formed links between attackers to attacks, attacks to defenses,
and attacks/defenses to their effects (Cohen, 1997). The simulator developed employed this
model to measure the effects of several variables, such as defensive strength and defense reaction
time on the outcome of the attack. The simulator developed however is based on predefined
models which were manually created and infeasible to keep updated within the current years
(Cohen, 1999). SECUSIM developed at the Hang Kong University, Korea in the Department of
Computer Engineering in 2001by Park et al. builds upon the previous work of Cohen. With the
addition of a graphical user interface, users of the simulator can, create customized naïve
network configurations, and specify attack mechanisms and defenses. Both of these simulators
used a naive representation of the computer network, not modeling specific vulnerabilities and
exploits (Park, et al., 2011).
Kotenko and Man’kov from St. Petersburg Institute for Informatics and Automation
created a software tool “Attack Simulator” with the purpose of performing analysis of computer
network vulnerabilities. Attack Simulator uses high level categories for attacks such as,
‘Identification of the host Services’ and ‘Escalating Privilege.’ To model the attack probabilistic
state machines were used sequencing each of these high level categories. Like the previous
simulators, a naïve network representation was used, and is no longer scalable to today’s
standards (Kotenko & Man'kov, 2003).
Kuhl, et al (2007), developed a cyber attack simulator in ARENA, a commercial
simulation software with the purpose of generating IDS alerts and a ground truth file associated
with the attack. This simulator was capable of allowing a user to model and setup a computer
network consisting of three main components: connectors, machines, and subnets, where subnets
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consisted of a group of identical machines. Machines contained on the network had a few
parameters such as the type of operating system, the IP address of the machine, and if the
machines was observed by an IDS sensor. This simulator also employed a guidance template,
which became the base of the SGT. This guidance template was composed of nine separate
stages which represented high level hacker actions during a cyber attack. These stages were
formed into a graph to model the potential sequences of a hackers actions on a per machine basis.
An attack was chosen based on a categorized list of 2,237 exploits divided into 5 groups with in
total 23 subgroups. Within this simulator basic attack behavior was also modeled using three
parameters: efficiency, skill, and stealth. Within ARENA this simulator was capable of running
up to 25 attacks with 250 steps per attack. Also like the other simulators, this model captures a
high level simulation of cyber attacks, using a high level representation of the attacker and the
network (Kuhl, Kistner, Costantini, & Sudit, 2007).
4.4 Cyber Situational Awareness
Barford, et al. define three main phases of Cyber SA, Cyber defense can be broken into three
phases: situation recognition, situation comprehension, and situation projection. These three
phases contain multiple aspects, seven in total each of which are treated as different research
problems, however the integration of the solutions to all of these aspects is required to develop a
Cyber SA system. Table 1 shows the three phases and their corresponding aspects (Barford, et
al., 2010).
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Table 1: The various aspects of cyber situational awareness

Situation Recognition

Situation Comprehension







Awareness of the current
situation
Awareness of the quality
of the observed and
predicted information.




Situation Projection

Awareness of the attack

impact.
Awareness of the attacker
behavior.

Awareness of how the
attack was caused.

Awareness of the
evolution and tracking of
the attack.
Assess possible futures
for the current situation.

The development of a cyber attack simulator capable of modeling diverse attacks scenarios and
attack behaviors can aid in the development of solutions to many of the above aspects. The
ability to provide IDS output will greatly aid in several of the aspects alone.
4.5 Cyber Attack Models
This section of the literature review is devoted to the discussion of cyber attack models. Research
in cyber attack modeling is expansive in both methods and area of focus. A large portion of
research in attack modeling has been focused on the concept of attack graphs which will be
briefly discussed. Along with attack graphs, a few other cyber attack models relevant to this
research problem will be discussed.
Attack graphs are a commonly used technique when it comes to modeling and forecasting
cyber attacks. An attack graph is a directed graph that can contain two types of vertices, network
security conditions and vulnerabilities. A fully developed attack graph is capable of modeling all
of the potential ways that an attacker can infiltrate a network. A highly scalable tool has been
developed called Topological Vulnerability Analysis (TVA) which is capable of performing
analysis of large networks and their vulnerabilities, and vulnerability interdependencies, through
the development of an attack graph. The attack graph developed provides a representation of all
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of the potential attack paths an attacker can use to infiltrate a network which can be scanned into
TVA using a variety of network scanning software. In order to populate the vulnerabilities of the
network, TVA uses several vulnerability databases one being the NVD. After the attack graph is
generated, analysis can be done by TVA on various aspects such as, how a change of machine or
introduction of a new vulnerability can affect the network, which areas of the network are at high
risk, and the impact of a measure taken to alleviate risk (Jajodia & Steven, 2010).

25

CHAPTER 5: CYBER ATTACK AND NETWORK DEFENSE
SIMULATOR (CASCADES)
As time goes by cyber attacks and the defenses to prevent these attacks are becoming more and
more complex. In order to keep an accurate representation of this, a new cyber attack simulator is
in the process of being created. The simulator, Cyber Attack SCenario And network DEfense
Simulator (CASCADES) is based on MASS, and not only adds upon its capabilities, but it has
been designed to allow future revisions to be added more easily. This flexibility of redesign
allows the simulator to stay prevalent in the constantly evolving methods of cyber attacks and
defenses.
The additional features being implemented into CASCADES will allow a more realistic
representation of cyber attacks, cyber attacker behavior, the network, and its defenses. The work
of this thesis is, however, focused around the user, allowing them more flexibility and
capabilities with the design and setup of the attack scenario. This work will also provide the user
with the ability to analyze the various inputs before attempting to simulate the attack scenario.
The analysis will provide a look into how likely CASCADES will produce a successful result of
their designed attack sequences, and enable them to identify potential areas of redesign within
the various inputs.
5.1 The Simulation Core
A major redesign of MASS’s core is needed in order to allow CASCADES to have the needed
flexibility and model accuracy. The current design of the core limits the ability to easily add
additional features to the various context models which represent, the network, its defenses, the
attacker, and the goal of the attack sequence. This truly limits the simulator to staying current
with the evolving cyber world. With MASS the context models were designed to maintain
independence from one another. This would allow a user to create simulations while using any
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combination of the context models. This adds the capability of simulating various attacker
behaviors, and sequence goals, while maintaining the same network definition. This feature is
highly needed; however, the core of the simulator handles the processing and the communication
between each of these context models heavily, while the context models themselves are mainly
used as inputs to the simulation core.
With this in mind, the same flexibility will be kept allowing a user to easily swap in and out
context models. In addition, each context model will process its own information. The core of
CASCADES is designed to provide the communication between the context models,
congregating, translating, and relaying the needed information to each of the context models at
the correct time. Allowing the core to focus mainly on the communication and translation of
information allows new features to be implemented within the context models, or full redesigns
of a particular context model to be more easily accomplished. These adaptations and capabilities
of the core allow CASCADES to adapt and evolve along with computer networks, their defenses,
cyber attacks, and attacker behaviors enabling accurate modeling and simulation of cyber attacks
to be conducted in the future.
5.2 The Context Models
As mentioned, the context models will now not only provide the input to the simulator, but
process their own information providing ease of redesign and a more flexible core structure for
CASCADES. With addition to the context model processors, CASCADES will contain more
advanced context models enabling more accuracy and flexibility to CASCADES. Each of these
context models will contribute their own individual portion of the attack sequence. These attack
sequences can then be combined and simulated at the same time creating the overall attack
sequence. Within the context models are the definition of the network, the network’s defenses,
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the attacker’s behavior, and sequence goal definition. Alongside these context models
CASCADES improves upon the modeling of the cyber attacks. The vulnerability hierarchy used
in MASS has been moved into an external database along with new information defining the
cyber attacks and their relation with the services within a network.
5.2.1 The Computer Network and Dynamic Defenses
In order to accurately simulate cyber attacks a representation of the computer network is needed.
CASCADES implements a context model called the dynamic virtual terrain (DVT) to do so. The
DVT allows the user to model a detailed computer network, containing machines, intrusion
detection systems, and dynamic defenses such as: IP address hopping, port hopping, and
dynamic firewalls.
For the model of the network the DVT adapts that of the VT.2 used within MASS.
Within the network model a user is capable of representing multiple machines, each with their
own services, ports, and permissions. Each of these machines can represent the various devices
that are contained on an actual network such as, routers, servers, host machines, etc. Intrusion
detection sensors can also be placed within the network. These sensors produce one form of
output of the simulator, and will spawn alerts dependent upon network noise and any actions
taken by the attacker on the IP range that that sensor monitors. The permissions that are defined
on each of the machines within the network represent the connections between the various
machines and their ports.
A new feature within this context model is the representation of dynamic defense
mechanisms such as, IP and port hopping. These defense techniques are promising researched
techniques that can thwart the attempts of an attacker by varying the machine information and
the network permissions which on current networks are static information. By changing the
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network, the defense can throw off the attacker and make their current knowledge of the network
invalid. This can cause the attacker to perform invalid attacks and allow the defender to prevent
an attack, or identify a current attacker within the network.
The new instantiation of the computer network and defense model was created by
Benjamin Wheeler. Through this work Wheeler analyze various IP and port hopping techniques
and also identified future areas of improvement for CASCADES. All this work is covered in
high detail by Wheeler (2014).
5.2.2 The Behavior of the Attacker
The second context model of CASCADES is the representation of the attacker behavior. The
majority of this model is currently in planning and development but will capture a more accurate
representation of the attacker’s capabilities, skills, and preferences. The ABM currently used in
MASS has various parameters that can be set to represent the capabilities, skills, and preferences.
It is, however, limited in the logic the attacker uses to progress through the network, and mostly
based on random selection. The current logic of progressing through the network is depth first
where each branch of connected machines is searched first before searching the breadth of the
network. The methods used in network search greatly limits the results of the simulator and the
accuracy of the model. In order to improve upon this, the context model will store the active
knowledge of the network and evaluate this knowledge to decide what attack and which area of
the network to perform the attack on. A base attacker knowledge was implemented by Wheeler
but is limited and cannot react to the moving target defenses that were added with the DVT.
5.2.3 The Attack Guidance Template
The final context model for CASCADES represents the definition of the attack sequence and the
goal that the user wants to see and the attacker is trying to accomplish. This context model
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replaces the Scenario Guidance Template (SGT) used in MASS. The SGT takes a high level goal
based view, defining which attacks are required to be performed by the attacker to reach their
goal. The SGT also has capabilities to guide the attacker along the attacks that are specified. The
definition of the SGT is however difficult and complex. The user must truly think about the
attack sequence being model in order to obtain a successful result. This requires a high amount
of knowledge regarding the simulation back end, the network setup, and the attacker behavior
which is unreasonable to expect of a user.
The focus of this work has been on the development of a new guidance model, the attack
guidance template (AGT). The AGT will improve upon the issues that are faced by the user
when setting up an SGT as well as, additional capabilities and the ability to specify attack
sequence goals at a higher range of specificity. The new model will provide the attacker with a
high level view of what targets and what attacks the attacker should attempt.
5.2.4 Context Model Interactions
With the combination of the three previously mentioned context models: the dynamic virtual
terrain, the advanced attacker behavior model, and the attack guidance template the user of the
simulator will be capable of modeling and simulating complex attack scenarios. Due to the
complex nature of these context models and their interactions a user needs the ability to
understand if the behavior, the network, and the scenario defined mesh well. If they do not, the
user may model an attack that is impossible or highly unlikely to occur resulting in a large
amount of time wasted performing unsuccessful simulations of their attack scenarios.
This issue was prevalent in MASS and this work has provided a remedy with an additional
feature. This new feature is the context model analyzer, and provides the user a way to view their
defined attack sequences, and their interactions. Through this view, the analyzer provides
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information regarding how well the context models complement each other and what problems
may exist within the current definition. From the analysis view the user can deduce potential
changes that can be made to the defined attack sequences. These changes can then be made by
the user and the analyzer can show their effects. Once a user is satisfied, the simulator can be run
with the edited context models ensuring more successful results are obtained.
5.3 Simulator Architecture
As mentioned previously, improvements and features have been added to the design of
CASCADES. Major improvements include the processing relief on the core, and the more
advanced, easier to use context models. With these changes the inner logic within CASCADES
now varies greatly from MASS and will be covered within this section.
The core architecture of cascades is composed of a few components each of which is
responsible for a variety of the processing. As discussed, the inputs to the simulator are the
context models. Each of these context models are defined within XML files which are parsed
into the simulator and passed to the first main processing component, the attack controller. The
attack controller is responsible for initializing the simulator and is part of the overall attack
scenario which consists of the network and the multiple attackers being simulated. The AGT and
ABM are paired together by the attack controller, and it spawns each of the individual attack
sequences.
Each of these attack sequences contains their own ABM and AGT processor which
handle the logic for each of the context models. The DVT processor and the vulnerability
database are externally shared by each of the attack sequences. Also within the attack sequence is
the sequence core, which communicates with each of the context model processors and translates

31

the necessary information between each of them. The process that the attack sequence core
performs is outlined below in the flowchart.

Figure 6: Flowchart of the simulator core attack sequence logic

Shown above, after the attack sequence is initialized, the AGT determines from the current
information which actions are available for the attacker. These actions are composed of both
what attack the attacker should perform, and where the attacker should perform it. After this
process is performed the sequence core processes the returned information and translates it to the
ABM processor. The ABM processor then chooses the action it would like to perform, if no
action is selected a new set of actions is generated by the AGT. Once the AGT is unable to create
any new action sets the sequence will be considered unsuccessful as no actions could be chosen.
If the ABM chooses an action it is performed and the result of the action determines the
necessary updates that are needed. The updates can be made to the attacker’s knowledge and the
AGT as well as, the ground truth and the virtual terrain machine states. Once this process is
complete the AGT is evaluated to determine if the goal was met. If so the attack sequence ends
successfully. If the goal is not met a new action set is chosen and the process repeats.
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Once all of the sequences have ended, the attack scenario is considered complete and the
outputs are produced from the information logged during each of the sequences. The two types
of output files produced are the ground truth files and the sensor alert files.
5.4 Contributions and Focus of this Work
As mentioned, this work focuses on the development of the attack guidance template, laying the
groundwork for future development of the CASCADES, and the development of the attack
sequence analyzer. The contributions made by this work aim to aid in the development of
CASCADES while focused on improving upon and adding additional features to MASS. These
improvements aim to increase the flexibility and the accuracy of the modeling and simulation of
cyber attacks. These contributions will be covered in great detail in the upcoming chapters.
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CHAPTER 6: DESIGN OF AN ATTACK GUIDANCE TEMPLATE
The main contribution of this work is the creation of the Attack Guidance Template (AGT). The
AGT is one of the context models used by CASCADES in order to simulate cyber attacks. This
context model acts to guide the attacker along the attack sequence specified by the user. The
AGT accomplishes by keeping track of the attacker’s progress towards the completion of the
attack sequence, and providing a set of actions to the attacker to use their preferences to select
from.
Within this chapter the AGT will be discussed in great detail. An overview of the purpose
and requirements of the AGT will be discussed. Following will be a discussion of the structure
and features of the AGT, its components, and its processes. Following, will be an example
simulated attack scenario consisting of a single sequence that will provide a look into the exactly
how the processes of the AGT are implemented during the attack scenario simulation. A
verification of the AGT and comparison to the SGT is then provided and discussed.
6.1 AGT Overview
6.1.1 Purpose and Requirements
The overall purpose of the guidance template is to define the goal of the attack sequence and
provide guidance to the attacker along the specified goal. Within MASS the scenario guidance
template (SGT) served this purpose. The SGT was a graph like structure where the nodes
represented the stages of the attack, and the arcs represented the attacks that could be performed
to transition between these stages. The SGT was however very difficult for a user to define their
desired attack sequence goal. In order to define the SGT the user needed to deeply understand
how the simulator core controlled the attacker’s target and source selections, how the VT was
modeled, and what was contained within the ABM. The AGT has been designed to address these
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issues and add additional capabilities providing an easier understanding and implementation of
the guidance template.
The function of the AGT is to provide the ABM with a high-level set of actions to select
from that guide the attacker along the user defined goal for the attack sequence. This action set
intends to give the attacker a general idea of what to do next. This action set contains the targets
that are available and the attacks that should be perform on each of these target types. This action
set is first gathered by the AGT and passed into the core of the simulator. Within the core the
information is translated to the ABM. The ABM will then attempt to choose and perform an
action from the set using its capabilities, preferences, and skill set. Once the action has been
attempted, the information about the performed action is fed back to the AGT which will then
update and determine if the goal of the attack sequence was met or if the attacker needs a new set
of actions to select from.
In order to enable the AGT to perform this function the user must be capable of defining
a few things. The first is the actions that are available throughout the attack sequence. The next is
the actions that cause a change in the available actions or cause a progression towards sequence
goal. Along with this design requirement, an AGT must be able to be created at any level of
complexity and specificity. Allowing an AGT to do this will enable any level of attack be
modeled, whether it be a very specific attack path the user is trying to follow or a generic idea of
what they would like to see, e.g. perform a DoS attack.
6.1.2 Structure and Functionality
To meet the needs of the user and the functionality required of the AGT design choices were
made carefully. The AGT consists of two views which enable the user to define the sequences.
Each of these views allows the user two different levels of detail at which to specify.

35

The first view provided by the AGT is the machine level view. This view enables the user
to define the attack sequence at a high level of detail, defining the specifics that they would like
to see. The machine level view allows the user to specify the categories of machines and
depending upon the state of the machine, which attacks are available. The next view gives a look
at the overall attack sequence. At this level the overall goal of the attack sequence is defined.
This sequence level view provides the user the ability to specify the actions sets from the
machine level view that are available during the simulation and which actions cause a
progression towards the goal of the attack sequence. The user can also specify which actions are
required in order for the sequence to be successful.
Overall, the AGT provides the user with a structure in which to define the goal of the
attack sequence and the set of actions available to the attacker depending upon: the machines
available, the current status of the attack sequence, and the progress towards the defined goal.
Together the two views allow s the goal to be defined at any level of specificity and gives the
user a great amount of flexibility. The following section provides a detailed look at the
components of the AGT, which allow the user to specify both of these views.
6.2 AGT Components
The AGT consists of two main data structures which define it, the machine level templates
(MLTs) and the sequence level templates (SLTs). Each AGT usually consists of multiple
machine level templates and SLTs. The machine level templates represent the machine level
view and define the action sets, machines and their corresponding attack sets. The SLTs
represent the attack sequence view and contain the conditions which control the available
machine level templates and the required actions to achieve the sequence goal. Together they are
used to determine the next set of actions that the attacker will choose from.
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The user is able define multiple of each these templates contained within a single AGT.
Like the other context models, the AGT and its templates are stored within XML documents.
The XML documents allow an easy way for these context models to be stored, imported, and
exported by CASCADES. During the creation of an attack sequence, the user selects the VT
XML file, and pairs an ABM and AGT XML file for each attack sequence. CASCADES parses
these XML files to create the VT, ABM, and AGT structures for the simulation.
6.2.1 Machine Level Templates
The machine level templates allow the user to categorize the set of actions that occur throughout
the course of the simulation. A single AGT usually contains multiple machine level templates
which specify all of the actions that are available on various machines throughout the entire
attack sequence. So overall, the machine level templates have two main elements, the machine
vulnerability condition, and the available attacks. The combination of these across all of the
available machine level templates make up the available actions for the attacker. The parameters
of the machine level templates in the table below.
Table 2: Parameters of the Machine level templates

PARAMETER NAME
Name
Vulnerability Condition

Attack Set, Machine State pair

DESCRIPTION
An identifier for the machine level template.
A condition defined by the user to specify the types of
machines that the attack sets within this machine level
template will apply to.
An attacker’s machine state and condition defined by the
user to specify the attacks that can occur on a valid target
machine within this template.

The purpose of the machine vulnerability condition is to set the type of machines that the actions
will be performed on. Each machine level template contains a single machine vulnerability
condition and if a machine meets the condition satisfied this machine level template can be used
by that machine. This condition queries the vulnerability database to determine which targets on
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the network are applicable for the associated machine level template. The machine vulnerability
condition is a MySQL query and allows logical operators including AND, NOT, and OR. Within
the vulnerability database are the following columns that can be used in the machine
vulnerability condition, Type, CWE, CPE, and CVE. A table of example conditions is shown
below. If a condition is not specified for a machine level template, every target will be applicable
for the template. This would be typical of a reconnaissance template, where the vulnerabilities on
the machine are not important to the reconnaissance actions taking place.
Table 3: Example Vulnerability Conditions

QUERY
CPE LIKE
“%MySQL%”
CWE == 94
CWE == 94 AND CPE
LIKE “%MySQL%”

DESCRIPTION
The target machines must have a service with a name containing the
string MySQL.
The target machines must be vulnerable to CWE 94, Improper
Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection').
A combination of the previous two queries where the target
machines must be both vulnerable to CWE 94 and contain a MySQL
service.

During the initialization of the attack sequence each of these machine level template’s
vulnerability condition is checked across the VT to determine the eligible target machines to be
used during the simulation. Along with this, the initial open machine level templates are set and
added to the list of available templates to select from. This process is shown below in Figure 7.

Figure 7: AGT Initialization Flowchart
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The next component of the machine level template specifies the attacks that are available to
perform. Each machine level template can store multiple of these components and are called the
attack sets. Each attack set is given an associated machine state: Hidden Exposable, Machine
Exposed, Services Exposed, and Compromised. Depending upon the attacker’s current state of
the machine, the attack set associated with that state will be used for the machine that satisfies
the machine level template’s machine vulnerability condition. Much like the machine
vulnerability condition, the attack sets are specified based on a query to the vulnerability
database. The result set of the query is what is used by the ABM when selecting an attack. Each
attack set has a Boolean parameter that specifies if the attack set is a MLT goal. This meaning, if
an attack step is performed successfully using this attack set from the associated machine level
template then the machine level template has been satisfied. Satisfying a machine level template
can have an effect on the overall attack sequence view defined by the SLTs and will be covered
within the next section.

Figure 8: SQL Machine Level Template
Figure 8 shows an example machine level template for a SQL exploit. As seen within the figure,

the machine vulnerability condition is “CPE like %SQL%.” This condition specifies that the
target machine must have a service with “SQL” in the name. This will allow the attacker to only
target machines that contain a SQL service, not attempting invalid attacks. Associated with this
template is the attack set that is specified for the Services Exposed and Compromised state. This
attack set is specified by the same query as the vulnerability condition. This is not a requirement
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to do, but allows each to machine to be vulnerable to an attack within the attack set specified. As
seen the figure these attack sets are also the MLT goals indicated by the asterisk.
Overall, this is the structure of the machine level templates. Using the features of a
machine level template, a user can specify the attacks that will be used on certain types of
machines. This allows the limitation of available actions on the various targets across the
network. These templates used in unison with the attacks nodes define the attack sequence and
its goal, together making up the AGT.
6.2.2 Sequence Level Templates
A SLT is the structure used to represent the attack sequence view of the AGT. Each AGT usually
consists of multiple SLTs, but can consist of as few as one and define the overall goal of the
attack sequence. The SLTs contain the conditions which determine which machine level
templates are available for selection and the chances of selecting them. It is important to note
that unlike the SGT, a single template is not tracked throughout the course of the simulation,
multiple SLTs are available to be selected from and used as guidance for the attacker.
Each SLT stores a list of associated machine level templates. During each iteration of the
selection of an attack action, a SLT is chosen. The chosen SLT’s associated templates are used to
send information to the core. This information is the template’s applicable targets and attack sets.
In order for a SLT to be chosen it must be available. The availability of a SLT can be broken
down into two states, open or closed. If a SLT is open, this means that it is currently available for
selection. If a SLT is closed, this means that this SLT will not be chosen. A parameter on the
SLTs determines if the SLT will initially be opened or closed. As an attacker progresses through
the attack sequence the availability of the SLT can change. This change from open to close, or
close to open is determined by the SLT conditions.
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In order to change the availability of a SLT there are two conditions that can be set:
Opening and Closing. When one of these conditions are met, the availability of the SLT will
switch from open to close or close to open. Within each of these conditions a user can specify
what must occur in order for the condition to be met.
Much like the machine level templates, each node keeps track of the number of times it
has been satisfied. Another condition within the SLTs is the satisfaction condition. When this
satisfaction condition is met, the satisfaction count on the SLT increases. Another parameter on
the SLTs determines if the SLT is a goal SLT. A goal SLT can be thought of as the ending
condition of the attack sequence. If the goal SLT’s satisfaction condition is met the attack
sequence will end successfully.
Each of these conditions: opening, closing, and satisfaction, are defined by variables
within the machine level templates and the SLTs. The user can utilize these variables to form the
SLT’s various conditions. Currently the variables are limited to the number of times a SLT or
template has been satisfied. Enabling a user to be able to use the satisfaction count as a variable
within these conditions allows multistep attack sequences to be possible. In order to do this a
SLT can initially be set to close, and the opening condition can be another node being satisfied.
An example of these variables in use along with the conditions is shown in the following section.
The final components of the SLT determine how and which node will be chosen. There
are two parameters that can be used, priority and weight. The priority and weight can be used
both independently and in combination of one another to determine the next SLT. The priority
value of a node allows a user to rank each of the SLTs, always choosing the highest priority
available node with the lowest priority value. For example, if there are two SLTs available for
selection with priorities one and two. The SLT with priority one will always be selected first.
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The weight allows the user to assign values to each of the SLTs in order to choose a SLT
probabilistically. Out of all of the available nodes the weights are placed into an array and
normalized. This array now contains the probability of each SLT being chosen. A random SLT is
then selected using these probabilities. If priorities are being used along with weights, the
available nodes with the lowest value priority are selected. If more than one node is selected, the
weights are used to select from the SLTs. The flowchart below in Figure 9 shows the process of
selecting a SLT.

Figure 9: AGT Sequence level template Selection Flowchart

When a SLT is selected its associated machine level template’s action sets are passed into
the core. The ABM will then choose a single action to perform, deciding what exploit to perform
and where to perform it. After the attack step has been completed, the AGT is updated. During
this update, the action performed by the attacker is checked against the machine level templates
to determine if they have been satisfied during that attack step. If a machine level template has
been satisfied, its satisfaction count increases. After the machine level templates have been
checked the satisfaction, opening, and closing conditions are checked on each of the SLTs. If any
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of the conditions are met on any of the SLTs, the appropriate action is taken. This update process
is shown below in the flowchart in Figure 10.

Figure 10: AGT Update Process Flowchart

6.3 An Example Attack Sequence
This section intends to demonstrate an example attack sequence, the process of developing an
AGT, and how the AGT functions. Within this section each of the function of the components
and parameters of the AGT will be covered in detail. For this example the goal of the attack
sequence is to explore the network and create stepping stones on two machines before disrupting
the oracle server on the network through a DoS attack. Before the review of the AGT used in this
attack sequence, the VT and ABM will be explained. The VT to be used within this attack
sequence will consist of ten machines and is shown in the Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Example Virtual Terrain

This network consists of a total of ten machines containing two Windows machines, two Linux
machines, an oracle server, a web server, and four routers. Of the four routers three are
accessible from the internet allowing a path in for the attacker. The first router connects with the
two Windows machines and the second router connects with the two Linux machines. The third
router is not accessible from the internet and allows communication from the Windows and
Linux machines to the Oracle server and the fourth router. The fourth router provides connection
from the third router and the internet to the web server.
Along with the VT is the second context model, the ABM. With this example attack
sequence a simple ABM is used where the attacker is capable of performing any attack and has
no preferences of attacks. This ABM will also maintain the same source and target until the
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target machine is compromised or the compromising of that target has failed. This ABM is use to
keep the example simple, and focus mainly on the AGT.
6.3.1 Creating the Attack Guidance Template
For this example the overall goal the attack sequence will be to setup an AGT that defines the
requirements of seeing at least two stepping stone machines be created before attacking an oracle
machine. When creating the AGT this sequence will contain an SLT and MLT for the two steps
of the attack the stepping stones and the oracle attack. It is important to note that this alone is not
enough to represent the entirety of the sequence and there are reconnaissance activities that need
to occur along the way. Therefore a SLT and MLT will need to be created to capture the
reconnaissance actions that will take place throughout the course of the simulation.
To aid in the definition of the AGT a graphical user interface (GUI) has been created.
The GUI allows the user to create a new AGT or edit an existing AGT and then save them in the
XML format. This GUI prevents the user from having to manually create or edit the XML
document which stores the AGT. This section provides a brief overview an explanation of the
GUI for this example. Appendix A.1 covers a more in-depth analysis of the GUI and its features
along with the details with setting up this particular example. An overview of the main panels of
the GUI is given in Figure 12. As seen in the figure the GUI contains two panes. The leftmost
pane shows a tree structure for the current AGT within the GUI. This tree structure will auto
populate with templates and their properties as they are added to the AGT. This template
provides a way to explore the various components that have already been designed. Within the
right pane is where the edits take place. In this pane, the various settings of the sequence level
and machine level templates can be adjusted and navigated through. As seen at the top of the
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GUI a “File” drop down menu is available. This drop down menu allows the user to import and
export the AGTs from and to a XML file.

Figure 12: Overview of Empty AGT Main Panel

The AGT truly consists of the two main components the SLTs and the MLTs. Within the right
panel of Figure 12, both of these components can be added by pressing the corresponding “Add”
buttons. Either of these templates can be setup first however, the SLT requires an associated
MLT so this example will begin with the reconnaissance MLT. The reconnaissance MLT will
need to apply to every machine on the network, therefore, the vulnerability condition does not
need to be specified. For the attack sets defined within this MLT, there are two types of
reconnaissance that must be covered: Network Scan and Service Scan. These reconnaissance
attacks are performed within the Hidden Exposable and Exposed machine states respectively. An
overview of this template and the populated GUI MLT panel is shown on the left side of Figure
13: Reconnaissance MLT and SLT As can be seen the various information is represented within

the GUI for the reconnaissance MLT. For a more detailed look at adding attack sets and
vulnerability conditions please see Appendix A.1.
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Figure 13: Reconnaissance MLT and SLT

For the reconnaissance SLT, the name of the template, priority, weight, is SLT goal, and is open
parameters can all be set within the top portion of the GUI panel. For this SLT the SLT goal
parameter can be set to false since this is not the overall goal of the attack sequence and the
attacker should not stop if the reconnaissance SLT is satisfied. Since reconnaissance is the first
action that an attacker will usually perform, the “is open” parameter is set to true to allow initial
selection of this SLT. As for the selection of SLTs, priority based selection will be used within
this example sequence. This reconnaissance SLT will be assigned a priority of three making it
the least important of the three templates. The weight value can either be removed or left at the
default value of one. As more MLTs are added to the AGT Creation GUI, more will appear
within the associated MLT list allowing multiple selections to be made. For the reconnaissance
SLT, the reconnaissance MLT is selected as its only associated template. This allows the actions
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defined with MLT to be passed to the attacker if the reconnaissance SLT is chosen. Since this
template is not a part of the overall sequence of attacks to occur, and does not determine any
progression of the sequence it will not need any conditions.
The next set of templates to define are the MLT and SLT for the stepping stone actions to
occur. For the SLT, the SLT goal parameter is set to false and the “is open” condition is set to
true since there are no previous actions relative to the goal that must occur before this template is
used. For this template the priority will be set to two allowing it to be chosen over the basic
reconnaissance actions specified in the reconnaissance templates. For the MLT an attack set is
needed to specify the types of attacks an attacker may use to create a machine they can use to
further gain access into the network. A common attack type for this is “Gain privileges / assume
identity.” This type of attack will normally occur after an attacker has learned the services on a
machine, therefore, this attack set can be added under the services exposed machine state. For the
stepping stone MLT a vulnerability condition can be added to ensure that machines chosen for
this template are exploitable by a “Gain privileges / assume identity” exploit. For the
vulnerability condition and the attack set, the condition is Type = “Gain privileges / assume
identity.” Figure 14 shows the stepping stone MLT and SLT.
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Figure 14: Stepping Stone MLT and SLT

To begin the definition of the Oracle SLT the SLT goal parameter is set to true since this is the
final goal of the sequence and accomplishing it should trigger an end to the attack sequence. The
other Boolean parameter, “is open” will determine if this SLT will be available to be chosen
from at the start of the simulation. Since the oracle attack needs to occur after two stepping
stones are created the “is open” condition is set to false. For this AGT priorities will be used to
determine the selection process. As this is the final goal the attack sequence this will receive a
lower valued priority of one, indicating more importance. In order to end the simulation the goal
SLT needs to become satisfied. This satisfaction condition for the Oracle SLT will be based upon
if a single Oracle attack is performed successfully by the attacker on the Oracle server on the
network. In order to specify this the MLT will need to be created to define this machine
categorization and action set.
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The Oracle MLT will need a vulnerability condition that can apply to an oracle machine
on the network. To do this a condition can be setup to ensure that an oracle service is contained
on the target machine by utilizing the CPE column within the vulnerability database. The
vulnerability condition is: CPE like “%Oracle%” and will ensure that the target machine has an
Oracle service on it. The attack sets can now be developed for the MLT. For this template the
attack set also needs to be specified. This attack can occur any time after the attacker has
uncovered the target’s services, within the services exposed and compromised machine states.
The attack condition can be specified the same as the vulnerability condition. These attack sets
are also defined as MLT goal sets for this MLT. Setting these as the MLT goal will allow the
Oracle SLT to have a satisfaction condition referencing the oracle exploit being performed
within this template.
Coming back to the SLT for the Oracle attack, an associated MLT can be added for the
MLT just created. For the satisfaction condition on this SLT, the MLT’s satisfaction count can
be used. To develop this condition a variable can be setup that references the MLT’s satisfaction
count. This variable name is defined by the user, but for this example the name is set to
“OracleMLT_Satisfaction.”

The

satisfaction

condition

can

then

be

set

to:

OracleMLT_Satisfaction >= 1. So when the attack specified within the MLT for Oracle
machines is performed successfully, this SLT will become satisfied. Since this SLT is set as an
SLT goal of this AGT, the attack sequence will end upon the satisfaction condition being met.
Since this SLT is initially set to closed it will need to contain an opening condition in order to be
selected. This opening condition will allow the sequence of the attacks to occur. This opening
condition can be defined based on the stepping stone MLT being satisfied at least twice. Like the
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satisfaction condition, a variable can be setup to reference the satisfaction count on the stepping
stone MLT. An overview of the MLT and SLT for the Oracle attack is shown in Figure 15.

Figure 15: Oracle SLT and MLT

After each of the individual MLTs and SLTs are created within the GUI, the file can be exported
to XML via the file menu in the top left corner of the GUI. Also, the main screen of the GUI will
also contain all of the populated information regarding the templates. This main screen is shown
in Figure 16.
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Figure 16: Overview of Completed AGT Main Panel

6.3.2 Attack Guidance Template Logic and Sequence Results
The described AGT, VT, and ABM make up a single attack sequence that can be simulated by
CASCADES. For this example the attacker will start externally to the network. During the
initialization process of the AGT the machines on the network are checked against each of the
machine level templates to create valid target machines for the template. For this example, the
machine level reconnaissance template and stepping stone template apply to: both Windows
machines, both Linux machines, the web server, and the oracle server. The oracle template
however only applies to the oracle server. A summary of the attack sequence is shown within
Table 4: Example Attack Sequence Summary and will be discussed within this section.
Table 4 shows by row the machines on the network and the applicable machine level

templates. The main table shows the progression of the attack and what action sets are available
to select throughout the course of the attack. Highlighted in green are the actions that were
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chosen by the attacker. At the bottom of the table, the availability of the SLTs is shown while the
attack is progressed.
Table 4: Example Attack Sequence Summary (SS – SteppingStone, Recon – Reconnaissance, NS thru
R# – Network Scan through Router #)
Machine
Name

Priority Applicable
Level Templates
1

Windows 1
2
1
Windows 2
2
1
Linux 1
2
1
Linux 2
2
1
Web Server
2
1
Oracle Server

2
3

Sequence Level
Template Status:

Step
1

2

3
Gain
privilege

SS
Recon

4

6

7

8

NS thru Service
R1
Scan
Gain
privilege

SS
Recon

5

NS thru Service Service Service
R1
Scan
Scan
Scan

SS
Recon

NS thru NS thru NS thru NS thru NS thru NS thru NS thru NS thru
R2
R2
R2
R2
R2
R2
R2
R2

SS
Recon

NS thru NS thru NS thru NS thru NS thru NS thru NS thru NS thru
R2
R2
R2
R2
R2
R2
R2
R2

SS
Recon

NS thru NS thru NS thru NS thru NS thru NS thru Service
R3
R3
R3
R3
R3
R3
Scan
Oracle
Exploit
Gain
privilege

Oracle
SS
Recon
Oracle
SS
Recon

Closed
Open
Open

Closed
Open
Open

NS thru NS thru NS thru Service
R3
R3
R3
Scan
Closed Closed Closed Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open
Open

Open
Open
Open

As discussed the AGT selects a single SLT from the ones available to pass to the ABM. The
ABM will then choose from the available action set developed from the associated MLTs and
perform the next attack. Within step one, there are two SLT open: Recon and Stepping Stone.
However, reconnaissance is the only MLT with available actions, therefore, the stepping stone
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SLT cannot be chosen. The available actions from the reconnaissance MLTs are passed to the
behavior model. These are reconnaissance attempts through routers 1, 2, and 3. By random the
attacker selects the action to perform a network scan through router 1. Since the attacker is fully
skilled for this ABM the attack is always successful and the AGT is updated. The only changes
made in the AGT for step two is Windows 1 and 2 can now have a service scan conducted on
them. Once again the only option for the AGT is to pass over the reconnaissance template, and
by random service scan is selected and performed by the ABM on Windows 1. The successful
service scan cause a larger update within the AGT. For step three, the stepping stone MLT now
has an available action, to gain privileges on Windows 1 and is available for selection by the
AGT. Since the stepping stone SLT has a lower priority value than the reconnaissance SLT it
will always be chosen first. Once passed to the ABM, the attacker only has one selection of
target and attack type. The attacker however will still randomly select the CVE that is performed
on the Windows 1 machine. Once this action is completed successfully, the AGT is updated.
Now the stepping stone MLT has completed a MLT goal action and the MLT is satisfied. This
will increase the overall satisfaction count of this template to one.
For the fourth action, the AGT can only pass the reconnaissance template again. This
template is passed over and the attacker choose to perform a service scan on Windows 2. Once
this is accomplished the AGT now has another action within the stepping stone template. This
action is passed to the ABM, which performs an privilege escalation exploit on the Windows 2
machine. During the update of the AGT, the stepping stone MLT is satisfied once again
increasing the overall satisfaction count to two. After the satisfaction count is updated, the SLT
conditions are checked, and the oracle SLT’s opening condition is met. Now all of the SLTs are
open, however, only reconnaissance is available during step six. From here the attacker selects

54

reconnaissance through router three which reveals the oracle and web server IP addresses to the
attacker and the service scan actions for the AGT. During step seven, the attacker will choose to
perform a service scan on the oracle machine. This reveals the oracle services to the attacker
causing the oracle SLT to become available for selection. Finally, the AGT passes the oracle
SLT and its action set to the ABM and Oracle exploit is performed. Once this is accomplished,
the AGT is updated a final time, and the satisfaction condition on the oracle MLT is met. This
follows with the Oracle SLT satisfaction condition being met, completing the SLT goal and
ending the attack sequence.
For this example the AGT used a priority ranking to determine the selection of the
sequence templates. The AGT offers the ability to also use a weighted model for selection. The
results generated from using a weighted model can differ greatly from the priority based model.
Using weights over priorities will typically result in more randomness in the progression towards
the sequence goal. An experiment is conducted within section 6.5.2 discussing the effect of
weight on the overall attack sequence.
6.4 Verification and Comparison
During the development the AGT was extensively tested to verify the various functions:
updating, SLT selection, action selection, etc. Along with this verification, testing and
comparisons were performed on AGT and its predecessor the SGT. A discussion of the results of
this testing, the improvements of the AGT, and limitations of the AGT are provided within this
section.
To show the limitations and advantages of the guidance templates comparisons between
the AGT and SGT for two different attack sequences are shown. These two sequences range in
complexity and specificity. The first sequence is that of a more complex and guided scenario,
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almost attempting to simulate a particular attack path. The second attack sequence is a more
unguided and simplistic attack sequence.
6.4.1 Verification of AGT
The process of verifying the AGT involved creating test methods to ensure that the major
features of the AGT logic performed as desired and running experiments to show that the AGT
performed as desired. These test methods are created solely for the purpose of verification of the
AGT. There are three major components of the AGT logic that needed to be verified. These
components are the AGT initialization, choosing of a SLT, and updating the AGT. The logic of
each of these are show in Figure 7: AGT Initialization Flowchart Figure 9, and Figure 10
respectively.
For the verification of the initialization process vulnerability conditions were created to
test their functionality. The following vulnerability conditions were tested: Type like “DoS%”,
CWE = 94, CPE like “%MySQL%”, CVE = “CVE-2014-1510”, and a null condition. The null
condition is intended to apply to every machine. To supplement these created conditions,
machines were created containing services that would trigger each of these conditions. All of the
conditions were capable of sorting all of the machines perfectly as desired. Combinations of
these conditions were later compared using “AND” and “OR” operators.
For choosing the correct SLT and testing the update function, attack sequences were
simulated and stepped through. Both of these functions performed as expected. For the selecting
of SLTs, all of the options were evaluated: by priority, weight, and a combination of both. For
the updating of the AGT, the opening, closing, and satisfaction conditions were checked after the
completion of an attack step. These conditions were tested across variables for the satisfaction of
both machine level attack templates and SLT to test if the appropriate responses were produced.
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6.4.2 Experimentation
The first experiment performed on the AGT was to ensure that by defining additional steps to
meet the overall goal of the attack sequence that the expected results were achieved. This
experiment run used the same VT and ABM discussed within this chapter. For this experiment
the templates within Figure 17 were used for the various AGTs. It is important to note the pound
sign (#) within the Oracle_ST opening condition. For this experiment, this number was varied
between 0 and 4 to determine the effects on overall simulation. Expected from these results were
that the average number of steps would increase as the number of required stepping stones
increased above one, the minimum number of stepping stones required to reach the oracle
machine. Also, the average number of steps until the oracle SLT was opened would increase as
well due to the additional stepping stones required for the opening condition.

Figure 17: Experiment Templates

For each AGT, 500 replications were run. The total number of steps were recorded for each
replication and statistics were gathered to determine the result of adding more required stepping
stone actions into the existing sequence. Figure 18 below shows the 95 percent confidence
interval on the average number of steps performed versus the number of required stepping stones
specified within the AGT. As it can be seen from the plot having zero, one, or two stepping
stones does not make a difference in the average number of attack steps to reach the goal of the
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attack sequence. However, adding additional stepping stones past two increases the average
number of steps. From these results it shows that addition stages within the AGT will cause an
overall increase in the average steps performed when reaching the goal. From this experiment it
can also be shown that
due to some randomness within the simulation processing such as, the network traversal
conducted by the ABM additional actions within the AGT will not always produce additional
steps.

Figure 18:95% Confidence Interval on the Average Number of Steps vs. Number of Stepping Stones

A second experiment was performed to analyze the effects on the attack sequence by using
weights to determine the selection of the SLTs. For this attack sequence, the templates within
Figure 19.
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Figure 19: Weight Analysis Experiment AGT

For this AGT there are a few important definitions made. The overall template’s goal is to
compromise an oracle server. There is only one SLT and MLT specified for this. There is also a
default template that will allow the attacker to choose any action they would to perform and can
apply to any machine on the network. For this experiment the sum of the weights used across
these templates was one, and the weights: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9 were tested for 500
replications each. It was expected that by assigning a larger weight to the goal template and a
smaller weight to the default template, less attack steps would be used to accomplish the goal of
the AGT. The results of this experiment and these replications are shown in Figure 20. From
these results it can be seen that with a larger weight on the Oracle SLT the goal was
accomplished in fewer steps.
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Figure 20: 95% Confidence Interval on the Average Number of Steps vs. Weight on Oracle SLT

6.4.2 Complex Sequence Comparison
The first attack sequence to show is more of a complex example. For this example the sequence
goal is to perform the following actions in order: create a stepping stone machine, obtain data
from an oracle server by exploiting an oracle service, and DoS a machine. For the VT, the
network shown in Figure 11 will be used. As for the attacker behavior, within each model the
attacker will have the ability to perform any exploit.
To create this sequence within the SGT careful considerations need to be made when
setting up the various stages and arcs. Since every step of the attack is needed to be noted, nine
stages are needed. The SGT is shown in the Figure 21: SGT Complex Attack Sequence below.
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Figure 21: SGT Complex Attack Sequence

From Figure 21: SGT Complex Attack Sequence a total of three reconnaissance stages are needed
to represent the each of the main steps of this attack sequence. Although the stages contain the
same information, the outgoing arcs must lead to the correct stage which causes the repeated
stages. Shown within the figure is an arc which contains all of the oracle services. This arc in the
figure actually represents over 1000 arcs, one for each potential oracle service. Expecting a user
to define this many arcs in an XML file is unreasonable. Although the arcs have been created,
the SGT provides no way of restricting the attack or specifying the arcs across multiple levels of
the vulnerability database. The best SGT can do is to exploit an oracle service or read data from
a target machine, not the combination of the two. If restricting across the oracle service level,
this leaves a 1 in 13 chance of selecting “Read application data” as a type and successfully
completing the desired attack sequence. On top of this low chance, the sequence still has a
chance of being unsuccessful depending upon how the attacker progresses through the network.
If the attacker happens to select the web server first, the attack will be unsuccessful due to only
allowing one stepping stone being created. Due to the logic of the SGT and the nature of this
attack sequence there is no potential way of specifying the creation of one or more stepping
stones without interfering with the other stages and creating additional complications.
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For an AGT with the same attack sequence, a total of four SLTs and four machine level
templates are used. Figure 22 and Figure 23 show each of the machine and SLTs respectively.

Figure 22: Machine Templates Complex Sequence Example

Within Figure 22, there are four machine templates covering reconnaissance, stepping stone,
DoS, and read data oracle. Unlike the SGT each of the attack sets within these templates consist
of queries that are able to contain all of the desired conditions within a single string. There is a
one to one mapping between the SLTs and their associated machine level templates. As seen
within the conditions of the SLTs in Figure 23, the sequence to create a stepping stone, obtain
data from an oracle service, and then DoS a machine is obtained. Initially, the recon and stepping
stone SLTs are open. When the gain privileges / assume identity action is successfully completed
in the stepping stone machine template the SLT is satisfied. This triggers the oracle SLT to open
and be available to select from. A similar process is followed to open the DoS template. For this
example, priorities are used so that the sequence of attacks will be followed exactly as soon as
the machines are available for the attack.
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Figure 23: Sequence Level Templates Complex Sequence Example

The setup and definition of the SGT is rather complex compared to that of the AGT. A major
concern is a lot of knowledge is required on the logic of how the simulator chooses targets and
performs attacks in order to setup the SGT. With the AGT this logic is more visible as the AGT
decides upon both what attack set and the potential target machines for the attack step. With the
addition of the vulnerability database, the AGT is able to offer more flexible attack set definition
allowing multiple restrictions across the various fields.
For this attack sequence, the AGT was always capable of producing a successful
simulation. Due to the AGT and VT being very compatible, the only potential cause for an
unsuccessful simulation would be from an unskilled attacker. For each of the simulations, the
result of the attack sequence and the ground truth generated was highly similar. The only
randomness is due to the ABM since it is setup to select a random action from the action set
generated from the AGT on each attack step. An example result is shown below in Table 5.
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Table 5: AGT Complex Sequence Results

Out of 1000 replications, the SGT was able to complete the defined attack sequence 551 times,
55.1 percent. However, the reading of application data from the oracle server could not be
defined within the SGT. The true attack sequence was only accomplished, 54 times or 5.4
percent of the time. This low chance of creating a successful scenario can be attributed to several
factors. These factors include: not choosing to read application data from the oracle server, not
being able to find an attack within the vulnerability hierarchy, and initially selecting the web
server as a stepping stone leaving no machine available with an oracle service. An example of a
successful attack is shown below in Table 6. It can be seen that the results are rather similar to
the results of the AGT.
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Table 6: SGT Complex Sequence Results

From this example it is clear the limitations that were posed by the SGT with more complex
attack sequences. Implementing action selection instead of an attack selection from the AGT
enhances the ability of the simulator to find appropriate targets, and enhance the ability to define
an attack sequence allowing both machine type and attack to be defined. The vulnerability
database also allows more advance conditions to be placed on the AGT, and attacks to be easily
found by eliminating the search through the vulnerability hierarchy. The database also allows
specifying groups of attacks instead of specifying a single attack. The opening, closing, and
satisfaction conditions also allow an easy way to setup and define multi-staged attack sequences
without having to design the sequence based on the stage transitions that can occur due to the
simulator logic.
6.4.3 Simple Sequence Comparison
For the simple attack sequence example, the same VT will be used. The goal of this attack
sequence will be to compromise an oracle service. Both the AGT and SGT are capable of
modeling this attack scenario. The SGT for this attack scenario is shown in Figure 24. For this
SGT, there are a total of two stages a reconnaissance stage and the goal stage. Both of these
stages are unrestricted, however, due to the simulator logic, only reconnaissance activities will
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occur within the reconnaissance stage. Within the goal stage, any action can occur if the action
happens to compromise an oracle service the attack sequence will be completed if not the
reconnaissance stage is returned to. This SGT will be capable of completing successfully 100
percent of the time for this particular attack sequence. This is, however, only due to the oracle
server containing only oracle services. Since this attack sequence has a fully skilled attacker the
oracle server will always be reached and a vulnerability within one of the oracle services will be
exploited.

Figure 24: SGT Simple Attack Sequence

This SGT setup is rather simplistic and easy to define with exception to the arcs for the oracle
services and works well with this VT. For the AGT, two sequence level and machine templates
are created shown in Figure 25. The two defined SLTs are a default template and an oracle
template. Within the machine level default template the action sets contain all of the actions an
attacker can possibly attempt. The machine level oracle template contains an attack set for any
exploit on an oracle service for both the services exposed and compromised states.
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Figure 25: AGT Simple Attack Sequence

For the AGT, the method in which the SLTs are chosen must be decided. Although this is an
additional step, it adds a lot of flexibility to how the logic of the simulator chooses the next
action which is fixed within the SGT. If priorities are used for these two templates, actions will
be chosen randomly by the attacker until the services are exposed on the oracle server. Once this
has occurred, an oracle service will be exploited on the oracle server. If weights are used instead
of priorities once the oracle server’s services are exposed the goal does not need to be
immediately accomplished. If weights are used the default template can be segmented and the
way that the network is discovered can be changed. For example, a larger weight can be given to
machine reconnaissance, causing targets to be discovered more frequently.
6.5 Discussion and Limitations
Within this chapter the benefits, function, and features of the AGT were shown. The AGT
provides a way for the user to define the goal of the attack sequence and effectively guides the
attacker along the goal throughout the course of the simulation. The design of the AGT allows
both machine level and sequence level definitions to be made. Allowing the user the capabilities
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to define at both of these levels enables the modeling of complex multistage attack sequences.
The addition of the vulnerability database and enabled conditions to be created based upon it
enables the user to define attack sequences with either a high or low level of specificity. Also the
new core structure and the AGT guiding by action rather than attack decreases the complexity
and removes the need to be highly knowledgeable of how the simulation core structure chooses
the next source and target machine. The addition of the AGT creation GUI allows the user to
easily create, edit, and save AGTs to their XML format without having the trouble of editing the
XML files directly.
Although the AGT is capable of providing a great benefit to the overall definition and
guidance along the goal of the attack sequence, it is not without its own limitations. The
remainder of this section will discuss the identified limitations of the AGT. Some of these
limitations and potential solutions will also be discussed within the future work chapter. With the
current iteration of the vulnerability database, the overall query time is not as quick as desired.
This has led to overall slower simulation times than experienced within MASS using the SGT
and the vulnerability hierarchy. Also, the current structure of the AGT requires the user to know
the structure of the vulnerability database and MySQL query structure. This is not ideal and will
need to be corrected within the future. Along with the knowledge of the database, the AGT also
requires the knowledge of the transition between the machine states, and which attacks are
pertinent for particular states.
With the new core structure the AGT and ABM rely heavily upon each other. Currently,
however, the ABM has yet to be implemented. Careful planning was taken to ensure minimal
problems would be faced when creating the ABM; nonetheless, problems may arise during its
implementation and testing of their interactions that were not predicted and designed for.
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While the SGT was a graph-like structure, the AGT sequence level definitions are reliant
on conditions defined within the SLTs. Although this allows more complex situations to be
modeled, these conditions are not as visual and may be confusing for large and complex AGTs.
The AGT creation GUI although a start, would be more ideal if a more graphical interface was
developed enabling a more logical and visual way of representing the AGT. These conditions
also are currently limited to the satisfaction of a template. Other variables for these conditions
however may be desired.

69

CHAPTER 7: DESIGN OF AN AGT SEQUENCE ANALYZER
7.1 Model Comparisons
Due to the complexity of the interactions of the context models for an attack sequence (AGT,
VT, and ABM), it is difficult to determine the potential of the attack sequence completing
successfully. In order for the user to determine this, they must be deeply familiar with each of the
context models that were designed for the attack sequence. If context models are not well
matched the chance of a successful simulation of an attack scenario can be highly unlikely or
impossible. If the user’s objective is to produce a successful simulation of their attack sequences,
ill-matched context models can result in a large amount of unsuccessful simulations before a
successful simulation is produced. As the user repeats replications receiving unsuccessful results,
they cannot be confident in their cause. To aid the user in solving this problem a tool has been
developed. This tool is capable of analyzing the interactions between the context models in order
to determine any potential conflictions and provide the user with insight to the potential of the
attack sequence.
The sequence analyzer tool allows a user to load in an AGT, a VT, and the capabilities of
the attacker to determine and analyze the interactions between the context models. This tool
consists of a GUI where a user can load in the context model XML files and visually see their
interactions. This provides the user the ability to make determinations on if to run the simulation
or change a portion of the attack sequence to increase the chance of a successful simulation.
Within this chapter the tool will be discussed and an example attack sequence will be shown.
Within the appendix is detailed user guide that serves as a walkthrough to setting up and using
the analyzer.
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As stated, the sequence analysis tool consists of a GUI and consists of three separate panels
which each serve a different purpose. An overview of the GUI is shown in below.

Figure 26: Sequence Analyzer Overview

The left pane is the input pane. The input pane is where the user loads the context model XML
files and sets the capabilities of the attacker. Currently with the analyzer, only AGT and VT
context models can be loaded while a skill level is set to capture the attacker’s capabilities. The
skill level specified is referenced to the individual difficulty levels of the exploits contained
within vulnerability database. If the difficulty is less than or equal to the skill level of the
attacker, the attacker is considered capable of the exploit. After the context models are loaded the
user presses the analyze button and the analysis is conducted.
After the analysis is complete, the center and right panes will be populated. The center
pane, the analysis pane, contains a tree structure that breaks down the various sequence level and
machine level templates with relation to the VT and the ABM. Within this tree structure, the first
level contains the AGT structure with its children being its SLTs. The children of the SLTs are
the associate machine level templates and its opening, closing, and satisfaction conditions. From
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the machine level templates, the total number of unique exploits and the total number of exploits
the attacker is capable of is displayed. Beneath the machine level templates are the target
machines on the VT that are candidates for the template. At this level, the total number of
machines, percentage of the network, and number of attackable machines are shown. The lowest
level of the tree contains each individual machine and both the number of exploits, and exploits
within the attackers capabilities. From the SLTs the conditions are analyzed to determine their
potential of being satisfied. Through this analysis, a determination can be made if any of the
machine level templates or SLTs are impossible. If a sequence level goal template is considered
impossible, the attack sequence can be considered impossible as well.
The rightmost pane of the sequence analyzer is the exploit table. The exploit table allows
some visibility into the types of exploits that are available for this attack sequence. By selecting
either a machine level template or a machine within the network the right pane will populate with
all of the exploits for the available item. This table displays the types, CWEs, CPEs, CVEs, and
difficulty level of each of the exploits. A checkbox is included to allow the filtering by the
capabilities of the attacker to show only the exploits that are available to the attacker on the
selected item. This table provides a view into the exploits that the attacker could possess within
their capabilities to improve the potential chance of success for the attack sequence.
Overall, this analysis tool provides some visibility into the interactions and potential
outcome of the attack sequence. If the user deems the attack sequence to be unlikely or the
analysis proves the AGT as impossible, the analyzer allows user to return to the AGT creation
GUI to edit their chosen AGT. The new AGT can then be reloaded into the analyzer to observe
the effects of their changes.
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7.2 Example Sequence Analysis
This section intends to provide an example analysis of an attack sequence to show the steps a
user may take to improve upon the success of the simulation. The example that will be used is
shown in Figure 26. This example contains the same VT displayed in Figure 11. The overall goal
of this attack sequence is for the attacker to create three stepping stone machines on the network
followed by compromising an oracle machine. For the attacker’s capabilities a skill level of three
is assumed.
For this example there are a total of three machine level templates that are used, the
reconnaissance template, the stepping stone template, and the Oracle template. Each of these
machine level templates is associated with a parent SLT. As seen within Figure 26, the
reconnaissance template can be applied to six machines on the network. For the reconnaissance
attempts, no exploits are displayed within the analyzer since the information discovering
techniques are not truly exploitative techniques and not contained within the vulnerability
database. For the stepping stone template it can be seen that the same six machines are available
however, only three of these can be compromised by the attacker. This should raise some
concern with the user since all three of the machines are required in order for the attack sequence
to be successfully simulated. It is also a reasonable concern since only three of the 286 services
on the web server can be compromised with one of the attacker’s capable exploits.
Within the oracle machine template there is only one machine that can be compromised
for this template. However, the attacker does not have the skill set to compromise the machine.
This template is vital to the overall goal of the attack sequence. The sequence level oracle
template is in fact the goal template for this attack sequence, and the satisfaction condition relies
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on the satisfaction of the machine level oracle template. Since this machine level template cannot
be satisfied, the overall attack sequence is marked as “IMPOSSIBLE.”
From the result of this analysis the user may want to edit either the ABM, AGT, or VT to
produce a successful simulation. In most cases, the ABM and AGT will be edited since the VT is
usually fixed based on a real computer network. For this example the first thing to look at is what
can be changed to ensure that the attacker can accomplish the machine level oracle template. In
Figure 27, the exploit table pane shows some the available exploits on oracle services. From this

figure it is shown that there are a few available exploits with a difficulty of 3.5 that would allow
the attacker to compromise this machine and complete the attack. There are also few more
exploits within the difficulty range of 4.0 to 4.5 that the attacker could use.

Figure 27: Potential Oracle Exploits

From the analysis of this view the user can adjust the attack capabilities changing the skill level
from three to four. The application of this change in the attacker capabilities results in the
analysis shown below in Figure 28.
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Figure 28: Sequence Analyzer - Adjusted Attack Sequence

With the adjusted attacker capabilities list, the attack sequence can now be accomplished. The
oracle template is now possible for the attacker to exploit with 34 potential services to attack. It
is also important to note that the attackable machines has increased for the stepping stone
template which was also a potential concern for the completion of this attack sequence. These
two additional machines are the windows machines on the network and became available due to
a few exploits with a difficulty of four.
7.3 Current Limitations
Overall the sequence analyzer provides a way for the user to gain visibility into the interactions
of the context models, and the potential outcome for the simulation of the attack sequence. With
the use of the sequence analyzer a user can first evaluate their combination of VT, ABM, and
AGT before running a simulation. This allows the user to identify and address any potential
concerns that may cause an unsuccessful simulation. Providing the ability to detect if a potential
sequence is impossible or highly unlikely prevents the user from running endless simulations
before determining this fact on their own. Although the analyzer does provide a benefit to the
user, the analysis is faced with a few limitations.
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A limitation of the sequence analyzer currently only performs a less complex analysis of
the attack sequence. Currently the analyzer only identifies the attackable machines and those that
apply to the templates within the AGT. These machines however may not be reachable. No
analysis of the network layout is currently conducted and attackable machines may be behind
machines that the attacker is unable to compromise. Another limitation of the sequence analyzer
is the need of an ABM. Currently only the capabilities of the attacker are considered. With the
future addition of the ABM more variables and randomness are introduced which are not
accounted for within the sequence analyzer. Accounting for the preferences of an attacker can
provide a more accurate analysis of the overall attack sequence and potentially probabilistic
results can be shown.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
8.1 Conclusion
The production of cyber attack data produced from IDS sensors can provide a great benefit to the
research into the development of advanced cyber attack defenses. For example this data can
provide a great way to test automated detection and prediction systems intending to identify
cyber attackers and predict their intent and next actions. The data needed by these researchers
however needs to be customizable and come from a variety of cyber attacks on various networks
with different attackers. This work introduces CASCADES which aims to solve this problem by
modeling cyber attacks and producing this cyber attack data.
The primary contribution of this thesis work defines and implements the AGT within a
new simulator core structure. The AGT is a flexible context model for specifying and tracking
the goal of the attack sequence while guiding the attacker along the defined goal. The AGT
provides a highly flexible structure to define attack sequence goals with large various
specificities and provide different methods to guide the attacker. The new logic of the simulator
core having the AGT always provide an initial set of actions (target machine and attack set) to
the ABM eliminates the user from needed to know the details of the simulation core and how
machines are selected. Also providing the AGT the ability to specify and guide the available
attacks based upon the machines available to the attacker the simulator allow the definition of
more complex attack scenarios. To aid the user in the definition and setup of the AGT a user
interface was also created. The GUI eliminated the need to directly edit the XML files containing
the data for the AGT. From the comparison to the SGT the improvements made by the AGT are
clear. The AGT meets the goal of this work and is capable of defining more complex attack
sequences and guides the attacker with more flexibility.
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Due to the complex interactions of the ABM, AGT, and VT it is difficult to determine the
potential of an attack sequence. With MASS if the attack sequence context models were
incompatible and resulted in an unlikely or impossible simulation the user would have to
complete countless replications of unsuccessful simulation before determining that the sequence
was impossible. The second contribution of this work is the creation of attack sequence analyzer.
The sequence analyzer provides a GUI where the user is capable of loading in an attack
sequence: ABM, AGT, and VT. Once these context models have been loaded analysis is
conducted and displayed to make determinations on the potential chance of success of the attack
sequence. It is shown that the sequence analyzer is capable of providing visibility to the user in
the success of the attack sequence.
8.2 Future Work
This section intends to discuss the future work that can be conducted related to that of the AGT,
the sequence analyzer, and CASCADES as a whole. The potential future work discussed can
provide benefit to CASCADES and address a few of its limitations. This section will be broken
into the following categories: CASCADES, the AGT, and the sequence analyzer.
8.2.1 CASCADES
The first area for potential future work is that to CASCADES without pertaining to the AGT and
the sequence analyzer. The future work for CASCADES will improve the performance, function,
and validity of the simulator.
Attacker Behavior Model
The first potential are for future work for the simulator is the implementation of a new ABM.
The current ABM uses sets of parameters to determine the skill, stealth, and capabilities of the
attacker. A basic model of attacker knowledge was added in the work of Wheeler (2014) to
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complement the dynamic virtual terrain. The ABM has not been adjusted to use its knowledge
sufficiently. The current ABM also does not contain preferences to how source and target
machines are selected on the network, only the selection of attacks. The implementation of a
more advanced attacker knowledge and logic process of using this knowledge to select the next
action would greatly benefit CASCADES.
Due to the large relationship between the AGT and the ABM, testing will need to be
conducted to discover any unforeseen issues that were not planned for in the design of the
simulation core logic. Along with the AGT the sequence analyzer will need to be adapted for use
with the new ABM.
Improved Vulnerability Database
In order to further improve the performance of CASCADES a new vulnerability database
implementation is needed. The current vulnerability database is not optimized for queries and is
the major cause for the increased time to conduct simulations of attack scenarios. With an
external storage model for the vulnerabilities, additional information can be store within the
database such as, CWE, CPE, and CVE descriptions as well as, CVSS data.
Router Vulnerabilities and Exploits
Currently routers are treated purely as multipoint connectors in the simulator and no
vulnerabilities or exploits are modeled on them. Router exploits are however a highly common
technique used by hackers to compromise and gain access to the information on and traveling
through the router. The effects of router exploits vary but some are capable of gaining access to
valuable information and data from all machines sending traffic through the router. With the
addition of router vulnerabilities the validity of CASCADES will increase.
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CASCADES GUI
The current version of CASCADES is mainly console based, and the attack sequences and the
attack scenario are created and simulated from the console. To improve CASCADES a full
advanced front-end should be designed and implemented. The front-end should consist of a GUI
and should allow the creation of VTs, defenses, AGTs, and ABMs. Additionally the GUI should
allow the simulator and its parameters to be setup and ran. The results of the simulations should
also be displayed.
8.2.2 The AGT
Future work can be conducted to the AGT to address the limitations discussed in section 6.6 and
further the flexibility and capabilities of the AGT. Within this section various areas of future
work will be discussed.
Source Selection Guidance and Conditions
A single attack action consists of three components, the source, the target, and the exploit.
Within the AGT a user is capable of defining the types of target machine and the exploits that are
available for that target type. This target and exploit set pairs are used to guide the attacker to the
goal of the attack sequence. Although defining the target is a good start some users potentially
may want to specify the source machine as well. In order to accomplish this, a condition can be
added to the machine level templates along with the vulnerability condition to specify the source
machines applicable to the template. With the addition of this condition and the ability to specify
the source machine allows the capabilities to guide by a source, a target, or a source and target
pair.
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Additional Condition Variables
Currently with the AGT the SLTs implement conditions that utilize variables. The current
variables can only be created based on the satisfaction count of either a sequence or machine
level template. For most attack sequences the satisfaction condition is enough to setup sequences
of attacks. For unique attack sequences a user may want to create other options that allow a SLT
to open, close, or become satisfied. Such conditions may be, the number of times an attacker fails
a template or the number of times a template is attempted. These conditions can allow more
advanced sequence goals to be modeled. The AGT has been setup to allow any type of variables
be added to the conditions as long as the variable can be recorded within CASCADES and
passed into the condition evaluation class. Adding more variables to the conditions would allow
more flexibility in the definition of the attack sequence goal and progression of the attack.
Vulnerability Database Conditions and MySQL Queries
The attack set conditions and vulnerability conditions on the machine level templates of the AGT
query the vulnerability database to obtain their result. These queries are simply a string and
currently a user must know the vulnerability database structure and how to structure MySQL
queries in order to define them. Due to a new vulnerability database being implemented, this
limitation was not covered. A user knowing the vulnerability database and its contents is both not
ideal and should not be required of the user. With the implementation of the new vulnerability
database, the vulnerability condition structure and the attack set queries must be redefined. The
implementation of the new vulnerability database will also allow quicker query times and
improve the overall speed of the simulator.
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8.2.3 The Sequence Analyzer
The current sequence analyzer implements an analysis of the various components of the attack
sequence: ABM, VT, and AGT. Future work to this analyzer can further the benefit to the user.
Network Attack Path Analysis
One improvement that can be made to the analysis conducted by the sequence analyzer is the
implementation of layout of the network as it relates to the sequence of attacks that must occur.
Currently for the machines that apply to the machine level templates, the exploits that are
applicable to that machine template and of those exploits the ones that can be accomplished by
the attacker are shown. To further the analysis of the simulator the layout of the network can be
considered. For example, if all of the external machines are not comprisable the attack will not
be successful. The current analyzer cannot predict this for it only finds the applicable machines.
This could mean that an applicable machine is not reachable by the attacker. Network attack path
analysis can also be performed to determine the likelihood of certain machines being
compromised. The analysis of the network structure and the potential attack path would greatly
improve the results of the analyzer.
Attacker Behavior Model Analysis
With the implementation of a new attacker behavior model the sequence analyzer would need to
be updated. Currently the analyzer only works based on the capabilities of an attacker based
upon a skill level. This does not take into account any preferences that an attacker may have.
With the addition of attacker preferences more probabilistic determination is needed. This can
allow the analyzer to perform a more deterministic analysis relieving the user of the need to do
so.
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APPENDIX A: USER GUIDE
A.1 Using the AGT Creator
This section will detail the AGT Creation GUI, and detail how to setup the individual
components of an AGT. This section will use the example from Section 6.3.1 to setup an AGT in
detail. The first step is to open the AGT GUI by running the main method contained in the
AGTCreator.java file within the UI package of the simulator. Once this is open an empty GUI
should show. From here there are two options, edit a preexisting AGT or create a new AGT from
scratch. Loading of an AGT is a simple process is a simple process and is shown in the next
section. The following sections will be dedicated to the creation of a new AGT.
Loading an AGT
To load an AGT into the creator first open the file menu on the right of the screen and select
open. This action will trigger a file selection menu to appear. By clicking on “Open..” a file
selection menu should appear. Next select an AGT xml file to load into the simulator and press
OK. Current files are located in the project folder under “../config/AGTs/..” Once the AGT is
loaded, the SLTs and MLTs will populate within the GUI. This AGT can then be edited and
saved again to create a new template.
Main Panel
The main panel shows all of the SLTs and machine level templates that are within the AGT. An
overview of the main panel is shown in Figure A-1: AGT Creator The left portion of the panel
provides the details on the information that has so far been created within this AGT. The right
panel controls the editing and creation of the AGT. From this main panel SLTs and machine
level templates can be removed, edited, and added to the AGT through the use of the buttons
located under each list box. When removing a template, first select a template from the list and
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then press the remove button. Pressing the “Add” or “Edit” buttons will replace the main panel
with either the SLT panel or the machine template panel.

Figure A-1: AGT Creator - Overview

Adding a Sequence Level Template
From the main panel press the add button under the SLT list. This should open up the sequence
template panel shown in Figure A-2: AGT Creator - Sequence Template Panel. Within this panel
the details can be specified that define a SLT. Notice also that a sequence template has been
added to the left panel containing the tree structure and the bread crump at the top of the GUI.
There are three text boxes located at the top of the screen. The template name text box specifies
the name of the template to be created and can be set to any string. This name is used as a
reference for the variables that are created for the conditions. The second and third text boxes
specify how the SLTs will be chosen. The upper text box is the priority and takes a positive
integer value. The bottom text box is the weight and takes in a positive real number. One or both
of these textboxes must be filled. Alongside the priority and weight textboxes, are check boxes
that determine if the template is initially open and if the template is a goal template. If the SLT is
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set initially open this means the template can be chosen initially if the attacker has access to a
machine that is applicable to the associated machine level templates.

Figure A-2: AGT Creator - Sequence Template Panel

If machine level templates have been defined they will appear within the associate machine level
templates list in the center of the template. Items from this list can be selected together by
holding Ctrl and left clicking on an item. The highlighted items are considered the associated
machine level templates for this SLT and will make up the action set that is passed to the attacker
if this template is chosen. The conditions specified on a SLT can also be added, edited, and
removed by using the buttons located under the conditions list. Adding a condition will be
covered within the next section. Below in Table A-1 a summary of each of the components of
this template is provided.
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Table A-1: AGT Creator - Components of the Sequence Level Template Panel

For this example the SLT name Oracle_ST will be setup from example in Section 6.3.1, details
are shown in Figure A-3: Oracle SLT Details below.

Figure A-3: Oracle SLT Details

To start the simpler things can be added directly onto the right panel of Figure A-2. This include
the name, priority, weight, open, and goal parameters. An update of this figure with this
information is shown in Figure A-4.
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Figure A-4: SLT Panel for Oracle_ST

Before continuing with defining this SLT the MLTs will need to be setup. This will be shown for
Oracle_MT within the next section. Press the confirm button to return to the main panel and then
press the add button under the Machine Level Template list. Notice that the name of the
sequence template within the tree has now updated to “Oracle_ST.”
Adding a Machine Level Template
To begin adding an MLT press the add button on the main panel. Pressing the add button will
bring up the machine level template panel and add a machine level template into the tree
structure within the left panel. There are two panels that are used to define a MLT, the MLT
panel and the sub-panel to define the attack sets. The MLT panel is shown on the left in Figure
A-5.
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Figure A-5: AGT Creator – Machine Level Template Panel (left), Attack Set panel (right)

This panel consists of three components the machine template name, vulnerability condition, and
the attack sets list. The machine template name textbox allows the user to setup a unique name
for this machine template to have. The vulnerability condition textbox is used to specify the
query that is used to check the applicable machines for the MLT. Attack sets can be added to the
attack set list by pressing the “Add” button underneath the list which will open up the Attack Set
Panel. A controls for the attack set panel are shown on the right in Figure A-5.
When adding an attack set there are four machine states that can be chosen through the
machine state dropdown. These machine states refer to the attacker’s view of the machine before
an attack specified within the attack set is performed. The table below defines each of these
machine states.
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Table A-2: Machine State Descriptions

When specifying both the attack set and the vulnerability query the vulnerability database is
queried upon. This allows a flexible way for defining large sets of exploits to guide from easily.
However, the user is required to know the MySQL query structure and the database design. For
specifying these queries the user first specifies the column they would like to query over.
Columns of the vulnerability hierarchy are: Type, CWE, CPE, and CVE. From here the user can
use a various number of operators such as ==, LIKE, and !=. The == comparator performs a
direct compare each element within the column and must match perfectly. The LIKE operator
allows a user to only define part of the items they are searching for. For example the condition
can be CPE LIKE “%MySQL%”. Finally the user specifies the value that the query is being
compared to. As seen in the example condition % signs can be used to indicate wildcard
characters at the end of the search text. This example tells the hierarchy to find all of the services
that contain the word MySQL. If this is specified for the attack set, any exploit can be chosen
that would compromise a MySQL service. An attack set can also be set as the goal of this MLT.
If specified as the goal, if an attack is performed successfully from this set the MLT is satisfied.
Once this attack set has been created the “Add” button can be pressed returning to the machine
level template screen. If the example condition is specified as the vulnerability condition only
machines containing a MySQL service will apply to this template. Once the vulnerability
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condition and attack sets are all created the confirm button can be pressed to save the MLT and
return to the main panel.

Figure A-6: Oracle_MT Details

As an example the MLT name Oracle_MT will be setup, its information is contained within
Figure A-6. Within the MLT panel specify the name and vulnerability condition as seen in Figure
A-6. For attack sets click add to create a new attack set and select the “ServicesExposed” state

from the machine state drop down. Within the attack set query box specify the attack condition
for this MLT and select the Template Goal checkbox (indicated in Figure A-6 by the “*”). Once
this is complete repeat the process adding an additional attack set for the “Compromised” state.
The completed MLT panel is shown below in Figure A-7: MLT Panel for Oracle_MT.

Figure A-7: MLT Panel for Oracle_MT

Press confirm to return to the main panel. From here repeat the process shown in the section to
setup the SteppingStone and Reconnaissance MLTs. When finished return to the main panel and
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ensure the GUI contains the same content of what is shown in Figure A-8: Example Main Panel
with All MLTs. Note: the order in which the information appears is not important.

Figure A-8: Example Main Panel with All MLTs

Once this is complete highlight the “Oracle_ST” SLT and select edit to reopen the Oracle_ST
template in the SLT panel. Once opened highlight the Oracle_MT line in the associated machine
level templates.
Adding a Condition
To add a condition to an SLT, the condition panel is used. The condition panel is shown in Figure
A-9: AGT Creator - Condition Panel (left). Each condition defined is either a satisfaction,

opening, or closing condition which can be specified by selecting from the combo boxes at the
top of the panel.
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Figure A-9: AGT Creator - Condition Panel (left), Variable Panel (right)

To define the conditions variables need to be created. To add a variable press the “Add” button
underneath the variables list. This will open up a panel containing the information shown in
Figure A-9: AGT Creator - Condition Panel (left), Variable Panel (right) (right). The variable name

is a string that the user can define as a unique variable identifier. This string value is associated
with a value that is defined using the other three controls. The object dropdown menu allows a
user to select either a MLT or a SLT. Once this is selected the object name textbox is filled in
with the name of the MLT or SLT that is being referenced. Finally the expression dropdown
menu can be used to specify what expression is to be used for the variable. Note currently that
the only expression available is the number of times that an object is satisfied. Once finished
with this panel press confirm to return to the condition panel.
Once back at the condition panel note that the variable has now appeared within the
variable list. Now a condition can be created based solely on this variable or another variable can
be created to create a more complex condition. For defining a condition on the SLT, different
operators and comparators can be used. These operators are: AND, OR, >=, <=, ==, >, and <.
The standard structure for defining a condition is: VARIABLE_NAME COMPARATOR
VALUE, an example of this is MySQL_SLT_Satisfied >= 1. This example condition can be
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strung together using the AND and OR operators with another condition to create a more
complex condition. Table A-3 shows a list of each of the components along with a description of
the variables and the condition panel.
Table A-3: Condition and Variable Panel Component Descriptions

For the Oracle_ST open the conditions panel and create the satisfaction condition by selecting
the option button at the top of the GUI. Next add the variable shown in Figure A-10: Oracle_ST
Satisfaction Variable.
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Figure A-10: Oracle_ST Satisfaction Variable

Once a condition is defined, press the confirm button to add the condition to the SLT. Continue
to add conditions to the SLT until all conditions are accounted for. Once all of the conditions
have been added the SLT is completed and the confirm button on the sequence level template
panel can be pressed returning to the main panel. From the main panel this process can be
repeated to add the reconnaissance and stepping stone SLTs. At any time the SLTs created can
be returned to by selecting the SLT and pressing the edit button beneath the SLT list on the main
panel. Once the example from section 6.3.1 is complete it should look similar to Figure A-11.

Figure A-11: Finished Example from Section 6.3.1
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Saving the AGT
Once all of the SLTs and MLTs have been setup, the AGT can be exported and saved to a XML
file. This can be accessed by pressing the save button shown in the file drop menu in Figure A-1.
Once this is pressed, the name for the AGT can be set and the file can be saved.
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A.2 Using the Sequence Analyzer
The main method to display the sequence analyzer is located within the SequenceAnalyzer.java
file within the UI package. Once execute an empty sequence analyzer will appear as seen in
Figure A-12.

Figure A-12: Sequence Analyzer - Empty Overview

Within the left most panel is used to load the context models. Simply by pressing the “Load
File..” buttons will allow the selection of the XML files. The VT XML files are located within
“../config/VTs/..” folder. The AGT XML files are located within “../config/AGTs/..” folder.
After loading the AGT and VT into the template a skill level can be set for the attackers
capabilities. This skill level is compared to the difficulty level of each CVE. Once a skill level is
set, pressing the analyze button will use the context models and analyze the information. An
example analysis is shown in Section 7.1, Figure 26: Sequence Analyzer Overview. To populate
the right most panel either a machine level template or an individual machine can be selected
within the sequence explorer (center panel). The filter by ABM checkbox on the bottom right of
the GUI will filter the available attacks by the exploits the attacker is capable of.
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